伊朗政權結構：從巴列維王朝到神權共和國的嬗變與困境

一、巴列維王朝的覆滅：現代化幻夢與民意的崩塌

1979年伊斯蘭革命前的伊朗，是一個在表面現代化下暗流湧動的王國。巴列維王朝的末代君主穆罕默德·禮薩·沙阿（Mohammad Reza Pahlavi）以“白色革命”為名，推行激進的世俗化改革——土地改革、婦女解放、工業化狂飆，甚至試圖用巴黎馬克沁餐廳的鵝肝醬和1911年份香檳來包裝波斯帝國的榮光。然而，這場“現代化”本質是一場少數權貴的饕餮盛宴：1%的皇室與官僚壟斷全國80%的財富，而農民分到的土地貧瘠到“比改革前更困頓”，城市貧民窟擠滿失地農民，傳統巴紮商人被連鎖超市碾碎生計。

當1971年巴列維豪擲3億美元在波斯波利斯舉辦“帝國2500周年慶典”，用37公里真絲搭建帳篷城宴請全球權貴時，電視直播的奢華畫面徹底激怒在貧困線上掙扎的民眾。正如霍梅尼的怒吼：“這些叛徒的狂歡與穆斯林何干？”8 經濟奇跡的泡沫下，宗教階層（歐萊瑪）、被剝奪的商人與底層民眾形成反抗聯盟，而巴列維的致命錯誤在於——他既摧毀傳統社會的根基，又未能建立真正的公平機制。1979年，這個依賴美國支持、卻失去所有階級擁護的王朝，在席捲全國的伊斯蘭革命中轟然倒塌。

二、神權共和國的獨特架構：法基赫監護下的“民主軀殼”

革命後的伊朗構建人類現代史上最特殊的政體——“伊斯蘭共和國”，一個將神權絕對性與共和形式強行焊接的產物。其核心架構如同一個精心設計的“雙重迷宮”：

最高領袖（法基赫）：真正的權力頂點，由宗教專家委員會“選舉”（實為哈梅內伊體系內指定），掌控革命衛隊、司法系統及媒體，能罷免總統、否決議會法案。霍梅尼的“教法學家治國”理論賦予其近乎先知般的權威。

民選機構：總統和議會經由普選產生，但候選人必須通過憲法監護委員會（12名成員中6名由領袖直接任命）的“伊斯蘭純度”審查。2017年，曾有1600人申請參選總統，僅6人獲准。

伊斯蘭革命衛隊：平行於正規軍的宗教武裝，掌握國家2/3國防預算，不僅鎮壓國內異見（如2019年燃油抗議中開槍打死1500人），還通過“聖城旅”在敘利亞、葉門等地輸出革命。

這種體制的吊詭之處在於：它用選舉制造合法性假像，卻用神權過濾掉所有“錯誤選項”。正如一位伊朗學者諷刺的：“我們有權投票，但無權選擇投票給誰。”

三、經濟制裁與貧富裂痕：神權下的生存現實

儘管伊斯蘭革命承諾“公正經濟”，但今天的伊朗貧富分化堪比革命前的巴列維時代。美國制裁的絞索下，2025年伊朗裡亞爾貶值至1美元兌100萬里亞爾（黑市價），而依附於革命衛隊的權貴集團卻通過走私、石油黑市和壟斷行業積累巨額財富。

觸目驚心的資料：首都德黑蘭北部的富人區擁有私人滑雪場和路易威登專賣店，而南部貧民窟的失業青年靠賣腎度日。世界銀行資料顯示，伊朗最富1%人口掌握全國61%的資產，底層50%民眾僅分得12%經濟增長紅利——這一差距甚至超過革命前的巴列維時期。

革命衛隊的商業帝國：控制伊朗70%的進口貿易、50%的石油出口，旗下企業涉足電信、建築、金融，年收入超120億美元。普通民眾卻因制裁失去抗癌藥，大學生起薪僅相當於每月30美元。

青年失業炸彈：30歲以下人口失業率高達25%，許多工程專業畢業生被迫開網約車。2022年因“頭巾法案”爆發的“女性·生命·自由”運動，本質是經濟絕望與宗教壓迫的合流爆發。

四、神權體制的困境：變革的呼聲與鐵腕鎮壓

今天的伊朗陷入某種詭異的迴圈：每當經濟危機引發街頭抗議（如2017年、2019年、2022年），當局便用子彈和斷網鎮壓；而外部制裁又進一步鞏固革命衛隊的斂財壟斷。年輕一代用VPN翻牆觀看Netflix，女性悄悄摘下頭巾自拍，地下派對播放被禁的波斯流行樂——這些細微的反抗正在侵蝕神權的根基。

然而，變革的阻力不僅來自鎮壓機器，更源於體制的“適應性腐敗”：權貴們早已學會在制裁中套利，而普通人的憤怒往往被導向“美國陰謀論”。正如一位德黑蘭大學教授的悲觀預言：“我們推翻了一個國王，卻迎來了更隱蔽的封建主——他們披著宗教外衣，口袋裡塞滿美元。”

伊朗的故事提醒世界：當現代化淪為少數人的特權，當宗教淪為權力的遮羞布，任何革命都可能淪為一場輪回的悲劇。而今天的伊朗青年，仍在尋找第三條道路——既不回到巴列維的西化幻夢，也不困於神權的鐵籠。

The Structure of Iran’s Regime: From the Pahlavi Dynasty to the Theocratic Republic—Transformation and Predicaments

I. The Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty: The Mirage of Modernization and the Collapse of Public Support

Before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran was a kingdom seemingly marching toward modernization, yet roiled by undercurrents of unrest. The last monarch of the Pahlavi dynasty, Mohammad Reza Shah, launched a series of aggressive secular reforms under the banner of the “White Revolution”—land redistribution, women’s emancipation, rapid industrialization—and even sought to repackage the glory of the Persian Empire with foie gras from Parisian restaurants and 1911 vintage champagne. But this “modernization” was, in essence, a lavish banquet for the privileged few: 1% of royal elites and bureaucrats controlled 80% of the nation's wealth, while peasants received barren plots of land that left them “worse off than before.” The urban slums swelled with dispossessed farmers, and traditional bazaar merchants saw their livelihoods crushed by the rise of chain supermarkets.

In 1971, the Shah spent $300 million on the extravagant “2,500th Anniversary of the Persian Empire” in Persepolis, building a tent city from 37 kilometers of silk to host global dignitaries. The opulence, broadcast live on TV, enraged a population struggling below the poverty line. As Ayatollah Khomeini thundered, “What does the revelry of these traitors have to do with Muslims?” Beneath the illusion of an economic miracle, an alliance of religious clergy (ulama), disenfranchised merchants, and the impoverished masses was forming. The Shah’s fatal miscalculation was this: he dismantled the foundations of traditional society but failed to erect a system of genuine justice in its place. By 1979, this U.S.-backed monarchy—bereft of support from all classes—collapsed under the wave of the Islamic Revolution.

II. The Unique Structure of the Theocratic Republic: A “Democratic Shell” Under the Guardianship of the Jurist

Post-revolution Iran established one of the most unusual regimes in modern history: the “Islamic Republic,” a fusion of absolute theocracy and republican form, forcibly welded together. Its core is a meticulously engineered “dual labyrinth”:

• Supreme Leader (Vali-e Faqih): The true apex of power, “elected” by the Assembly of Experts (in practice, designated within the Khamenei network), overseeing the Revolutionary Guard, judiciary, and media, with authority to dismiss the president and veto parliamentary laws. Khomeini’s doctrine of “rule by the Islamic jurist” grants the Leader near-prophetic authority.
• Elected Institutions: Presidents and members of parliament are chosen through public elections, but candidates must first pass a vetting process by the Guardian Council—of its 12 members, 6 are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader—based on their “Islamic purity.” In 2017, out of 1,600 presidential hopefuls, only six were approved.
• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): A parallel force to the regular army, this religious militia controls two-thirds of Iran’s defense budget. It not only suppresses domestic dissent (e.g., killing 1,500 protesters during the 2019 fuel price protests) but also exports revolution through its Quds Force in countries like Syria and Yemen.

The paradox of this system lies in how it creates the illusion of legitimacy through elections, yet filters out all “unacceptable” options through clerical oversight. As one Iranian scholar sarcastically put it: “We have the right to vote, but no right to choose who we vote for.”

III. Economic Sanctions and the Wealth Gap: The Reality of Life Under Theocracy

Despite promises of “economic justice” after the Islamic Revolution, today’s Iran exhibits inequality on par with—or worse than—the Pahlavi era. Under the tightening grip of U.S. sanctions, by 2025 the Iranian rial has devalued to 1 USD = 1,000,000 rials on the black market. Meanwhile, elite circles aligned with the IRGC accumulate vast fortunes through smuggling, oil black markets, and industry monopolies.

Startling contrasts abound: northern Tehran boasts private ski resorts and Louis Vuitton boutiques, while the slums in the south harbor jobless youth who sell their kidneys to survive. According to World Bank data, the richest 1% of Iranians control 61% of the country’s assets, while the bottom 50% receive only 12% of the gains from economic growth—a gap even wider than during the Pahlavi era.

• The IRGC’s Business Empire: It controls 70% of Iran’s imports, 50% of oil exports, and owns companies in telecommunications, construction, and finance, with an annual revenue exceeding $12 billion. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens suffer from shortages of cancer medication, and university graduates start jobs earning only $30 a month.
• The Youth Unemployment Time Bomb: The unemployment rate among those under 30 is over 25%, with many engineering graduates forced to work as ride-share drivers. The 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” movement sparked by the compulsory hijab law was, at its core, a confluence of economic despair and religious oppression.

IV. The Theocratic Predicament: Calls for Change and Iron-Fisted Suppression

Iran today finds itself trapped in a strange cycle: every economic crisis (as in 2017, 2019, and 2022) triggers street protests, which the regime crushes with bullets and internet blackouts; external sanctions, in turn, further solidify the IRGC’s monopolistic grip. The younger generation bypasses censorship using VPNs to stream Netflix, women quietly post selfies without hijabs, and underground parties play banned Persian pop music—these small acts of rebellion are eroding the foundations of the theocratic regime.

However, resistance to change stems not only from repression but also from what can be called “adaptive corruption”: the elites have learned how to profit under sanctions, while public anger is often redirected through conspiracy theories about Western plots. As a pessimistic professor at the University of Tehran remarked, “We overthrew a king, only to inherit stealthier feudal lords—cloaked in religion, their pockets stuffed with dollars.”

Iran’s story is a cautionary tale for the world: when modernization becomes the privilege of a few, and religion is weaponized as a veil for power, revolutions may become nothing more than cycles of tragedy. Yet even now, Iran’s youth continue searching for a third path—one that avoids both the Westernized mirage of the Pahlavi era and the iron cage of theocracy.