Uber在中國的起落：一場耗資百億的「打車大戰」始末

2014年，Uber正式進入中國市場，憑藉其全球品牌影響力與矽谷背景，迅速在北京、上海等一線城市鋪開業務。當時的Uber執行長特拉維斯・卡蘭尼克（Travis Kalanick）對中國市場勢在必得，甚至放話：「我們要讓中國成為Uber最大的市場。」

為達成這一目標，Uber祭出多項策略：提供低價補貼，新用戶首單免費，甚至比出租車便宜一半；推出「人民優步」和平價的「Uber Black」高端專車，涵蓋不同層級用戶需求；積極本土化，接入支付寶與微信支付，並推出「春節紅包」等行銷活動。然而，Uber顯然低估中國市場的複雜性與本土對手的競爭力。

與此同時，滴滴出行（當時仍為「滴滴快的」）已在中國市場深耕多年。2015年與快的合併後，滴滴幾乎壟斷國內網約車市場。為迎戰Uber，滴滴採取更激進的手段，包括瘋狂補貼（司機每單獎勵翻倍，乘客最低僅需1元即可搭車）、籌資能力（背後有騰訊與阿里巴巴等科技巨頭支持）、以及政策優勢（熟悉中國法規，避免Uber遭遇的「非法經營」約談問題）。

這場戰爭迅速演變成「全球最燒錢的商業競爭之一」，Uber每年在中國虧損超過10億美元，而滴滴同樣燒錢無數，形成雙方比拼資本耐力與補貼戰線的局面。

經過兩年激戰，Uber最終認清現實：中國市場燒錢無底，全球其他區域盈利卻難以填補中國虧損；加上中國政府針對外資網約車的政策風險日益加劇，Uber投資人也開始施壓，要求停止中國業務的虧損狀態。

2016年8月，卡蘭尼克親赴中國與滴滴談判，最終達成協議：Uber將其中國業務出售予滴滴，換取約20%股權（後稀釋至15%左右），正式退出中國市場，但保留全球其他業務。這筆交易被外界戲稱為「核和平協議」，宣告這場燒錢大戰畫下句點。

然而，故事並未隨之結束。滴滴在收購Uber中國後，坐穩中國網約車霸主地位，並於2021年6月30日在美國紐約證券交易所上市。上市僅三天後，中國網信辦即以「數據安全」為由，對滴滴啟動審查，並要求下架其APP。同年12月，滴滴宣布啟動美股退市程序，準備轉戰香港市場。

滴滴被審查的背後，反映的是多重敏感因素：首先是數據主權問題，滴滴掌握大量中國用戶行動與位置數據，政府憂慮其在海外上市可能引發資料外流風險；其次是監管環境突變，2021年中國科技業迎來強監管元年，滴滴正巧撞在「槍口上」；再者，中美之間在中概股審計權上的角力，使滴滴成為「殺雞儆猴」的代表性企業。

最終，滴滴於2022年6月正式從美股退市，市值蒸發超過八成，雖然之後逐步恢復新用戶註冊功能，但市場份額已被高德、T3出行等競爭對手蠶食。

總結來看，Uber與滴滴之間的「打車大戰」，成為近代互聯網商戰史上最具代表性的案例之一。它揭示出外資企業在中國市場的艱難處境：即使如Uber般強勢，也難以撼動本土巨頭在政策與資本上的雙重優勢；同時也反映「燒錢換市佔」策略的高風險代價，最終雙方都以合併收場，結束這場百億級別的戰爭。

此外，滴滴的經歷也為全球科技公司敲響警鐘：在全球化背景下，數據安全與主權問題可能決定企業的生死，而非單純的資金或業務能力。如今的Uber專注海外市場，而滴滴仍在中國市場內尋求復甦，而這場「打車大戰」的興衰成敗，早已被寫進中國互聯網產業的教科書中。

The Rise and Fall of Uber in China: The Billion-Dollar Ride-Hailing War

In 2014, Uber officially entered the Chinese market, leveraging its global brand power and Silicon Valley pedigree to rapidly expand operations in major cities like Beijing and Shanghai. Then-CEO Travis Kalanick was determined to conquer China, even declaring, “We want China to be Uber’s biggest market.”

To achieve this ambition, Uber deployed an aggressive strategy: offering low-price subsidies, free first rides for new users, and fares that were sometimes half the cost of taxis. It launched services like “People’s Uber” for budget-conscious riders and “Uber Black” for premium users. The company also localized quickly by integrating Alipay and WeChat Pay and launching promotional campaigns like “Spring Festival Red Envelopes.” Yet despite these efforts, Uber underestimated the complexity of the Chinese market and the strength of its local rivals.

At the same time, Didi Chuxing (then still known as “Didi Kuaidi”) had already established a deep foothold in China. After merging with Kuaidi in 2015, Didi held a near-monopoly on the domestic ride-hailing market. To counter Uber’s challenge, Didi employed even more aggressive tactics: offering massive subsidies (with doubled bonuses for drivers and rides as low as 1 yuan for passengers), harnessing capital support from tech giants like Tencent and Alibaba, and leveraging policy familiarity to avoid Uber’s troubles with local authorities over “illegal operations.”

This battle quickly escalated into one of the most expensive commercial rivalries in the world. Uber reportedly lost over $1 billion per year in China, and Didi was also burning vast sums of cash. It became a war of attrition over capital strength and subsidy endurance.

After two years of fierce competition, Uber came to a realization: the China operation had become a bottomless pit of spending, with profits from other regions unable to cover the losses. Regulatory risks for foreign companies in China were rising, and investors began pushing Uber to end its hemorrhaging.

In August 2016, Kalanick personally traveled to China to negotiate with Didi. The two sides reached an agreement: Uber would sell its China business to Didi in exchange for roughly a 20% stake (later diluted to about 15%), officially exiting the Chinese market while retaining its global operations. The deal was jokingly dubbed a “nuclear peace agreement,” signaling the end of the billion-dollar subsidy war.

However, the story didn’t end there. After acquiring Uber China, Didi solidified its dominance and went public on the New York Stock Exchange on June 30, 2021. Merely three days later, China’s Cyberspace Administration launched a cybersecurity review, citing data security concerns, and ordered the Didi app to be removed from app stores. By December that year, Didi announced it would delist from the U.S. and seek a listing in Hong Kong instead.

Didi’s regulatory troubles stemmed from several sensitive factors. First, data sovereignty: the Chinese government was concerned about the potential for leakage of sensitive user mobility and location data. Second, a sudden regulatory clampdown: 2021 marked the beginning of a new era of tight controls over the tech industry in China, and Didi happened to be in the line of fire. Lastly, mounting tensions between China and the U.S. over audit compliance for Chinese companies made Didi a prime example of political and regulatory risk.

In June 2022, Didi officially delisted from the U.S. market, having lost over 80% of its market value. Although it gradually regained the ability to register new users, competitors like Gaode and T3 Mobility had already begun eating into its market share.

In retrospect, the ride-hailing war between Uber and Didi stands as one of the most iconic cases in modern internet business history. It underscores the difficulties faced by foreign enterprises in China: even a global giant like Uber couldn’t overcome the dual challenges of local policy and capital power. It also reveals the high risks of “burning cash for market share,” with both sides eventually merging to end the battle.

Furthermore, Didi’s experience serves as a wake-up call for tech companies worldwide: in the age of globalization, data security and sovereignty may define a company’s fate more than capital or operational strength. Today, Uber focuses on international markets, while Didi continues to seek recovery within China — and the rise and fall of this ride-hailing war has already been etched into the textbooks of China’s internet industry.