哪吒汽車：從「新勢力黑馬」到破產還負債750億台幣的雲霄飛車之旅

哪吒汽車（合眾新能源）成立於2014年，總部位於浙江桐鄉。創辦人方運舟曾是奇瑞新能源的核心技術人員，具備扎實的汽車技術背景。與蔚來、小鵬等初期便以高端形象亮相的「明星新勢力」不同，哪吒自創立之初便選擇截然不同的發展路線——走平價親民路線，主打10萬元(人民幣)以下的低價電動車市場，重點深耕三四線城市及下沉市場，避開與特斯拉、比亞迪的直接正面競爭。

哪吒初期策略極具草根氣息。首款車型哪吒N01於2018年推出，起售價僅為5.98萬元，主打代步功能強、價格低廉的產品定位。公司與地方政府緊密合作，例如在江西宜春建廠以降低成本，同時大量將車輛銷售至網約車與共享出行平台，以快速擴張市場佔有率。

轉捩點出現在2021至2022年間，哪吒汽車突然爆發。旗下哪吒V和哪吒U兩款SUV憑藉超高性價比與超前布局的渠道策略，迅速取得佳績。哪吒V起售價僅約7萬元，續航可達400公里，成功鎖定預算有限的家庭用戶。公司透過大量在三四線城市開設銷售點，建立遍佈全國的下沉渠道網絡，進一步擴大銷售觸角。2022年，哪吒全年銷售達15.2萬輛，首次超越蔚來與理想，登上新勢力年度銷量冠軍寶座。公司還積極運用「哪吒」這一國民神話IP進行年輕化行銷，塑造「年輕人的第一台電動車」形象。

然而，光鮮數字背後的危機也在同時悄然醞釀。哪吒的商業模式過度依賴低價銷量，導致利潤嚴重受損。根據2022年財報，其單車毛利率為-15%，平均每賣一輛車虧損2萬元，全年虧損總額高達69億元。隨著品牌形象日益低端化，哪吒難以打入10萬以上中高端市場。再加上產品品質問題頻傳，如車機系統卡頓、續航不實等，嚴重影響消費者口碑與復購意願。

面對市場壓力，哪吒於2023年試圖推動品牌升級，推出哪吒S（定位於20萬級轎跑）與哪吒GT（跑車）。但這場轉型幾乎全線失敗。哪吒S銷量不振，月銷售量僅千輛，哪吒GT則被戲稱為「山寨保時捷」，市場反應冷淡。同時，公司大幅增加在研發與行銷上的投入，卻面臨融資困難，資金缺口快速擴大。主要投資者如360集團開始減持套現，地方政府的扶持亦逐步減弱。

2024年，哪吒汽車的危機全面爆發。媒體揭露其位於桐鄉與宜春的生產基地已停工，供應商貨款遭拖欠，裁員規模高達80%，從巔峰時期的6000多人縮減至不到1000人。同年，公司正式申請破產重整，希望引入新投資人以續命，但未見明朗結果。

導致哪吒走向邊緣化的核心問題可歸結為三大錯誤：其一是過度依賴低價策略，卻無法建立健康的盈利模型，在補貼退坡、電池成本上升的環境下迅速失血；其二是在技術上無核心優勢，智能化與三電系統均無突破，淪為外觀設計為主的「組裝廠」；其三是錯判市場節奏，盲目衝擊高端市場卻無品牌支撐，結果高端賣不動，基礎市場也流失。

哪吒的沉浮，為中國新能源車市場提供殘酷的現實教訓——僅有銷量是遠遠不夠的，沒有技術壁壘、品牌溢價與穩健現金流的企業，即便曾經領跑，也可能迅速墜落。如今，哪吒這個名字更多地出現在「新勢力陣亡名單」之中，而非銷量榜單上，成為一段尚未寫完的悲壯篇章。

Nezha Auto: From "Dark Horse of New Forces" to a Roller-Coaster Fall with NT$75 Billion Debt

Nezha Auto (officially known as Hozon New Energy) was founded in 2014 and is headquartered in Tongxiang, Zhejiang. Its founder, Fang Yunzhu, was once a core technical expert at Chery New Energy, bringing with him a solid automotive engineering background. Unlike other emerging EV startups like NIO and XPeng that initially positioned themselves as premium brands, Nezha chose a radically different path from the start—targeting the affordable market with electric vehicles priced under RMB 100,000, focusing on third- and fourth-tier cities and rural markets to avoid direct competition with giants like Tesla and BYD.

In its early years, Nezha adopted a grassroots approach. Its first model, the Nezha N01, launched in 2018, had a starting price of just RMB 59,800 and was positioned as a budget-friendly commuting solution. The company worked closely with local governments—such as setting up a factory in Yichun, Jiangxi, to cut production costs—and sold large volumes of vehicles to ride-hailing and car-sharing platforms to quickly expand market share.

A turning point came between 2021 and 2022. Nezha Auto suddenly surged ahead with its V and U series SUVs, which became hot sellers thanks to their exceptional cost-performance ratio and forward-looking channel strategies. The Nezha V, priced at around RMB 70,000, offered a driving range of up to 400 kilometers, making it especially attractive to budget-conscious families. By setting up sales outlets in lower-tier cities across the country, Nezha built a widespread retail network that vastly increased its reach. In 2022, Nezha sold 152,000 vehicles, surpassing both NIO and Li Auto to become the top-selling "new force" EV brand of the year. The brand also leaned heavily into the youthful appeal of the "Nezha" mythological figure to craft an image of being the "first EV for young people."

However, behind these dazzling figures, a crisis was quietly brewing. Nezha’s business model heavily depended on selling low-cost cars, which severely undermined profitability. According to its 2022 financial report, the gross profit margin per vehicle was -15%, with the company losing about RMB 20,000 on each unit sold—resulting in a total annual loss of RMB 6.9 billion. As the brand's image became increasingly associated with the low-end market, Nezha struggled to break into the mid- to high-end segment above RMB 100,000. Compounding the issue were recurring quality complaints, such as laggy infotainment systems and overstated range claims, which hurt consumer reputation and return customer interest.

In response to market pressures, Nezha attempted a brand upgrade in 2023 by launching the Nezha S (a sporty sedan priced around RMB 200,000) and Nezha GT (a coupe-style sports car). Yet this transformation largely failed. The Nezha S saw sluggish sales, with monthly deliveries barely exceeding 1,000 units, while the GT was mocked as a "Porsche knockoff" and received a tepid market response. Meanwhile, the company significantly increased spending on R&D and marketing, but faced mounting difficulties raising funds. Major investors like cybersecurity firm 360 began cashing out their stakes, and local government support waned.

By 2024, Nezha Auto’s crisis had fully erupted. Media reports revealed that its production bases in Tongxiang and Yichun had ceased operations, supplier payments were in arrears, and the company had laid off 80% of its workforce—shrinking from over 6,000 employees at its peak to fewer than 1,000. That same year, the company formally filed for bankruptcy restructuring in hopes of attracting new investors to stay afloat, though no clear outcome has emerged.

Nezha’s marginalization stems from three core strategic missteps. First, it overly relied on a low-price strategy without building a sustainable profit model. Once government subsidies were rolled back and battery costs rose, the company began hemorrhaging cash. Second, Nezha lacked any technological edge—its intelligent systems and powertrains offered no real breakthroughs, reducing it to more of an assembly plant focused on aesthetics rather than innovation. Third, it misjudged market timing by rushing into the high-end segment without a strong brand foundation. As a result, its premium models failed to sell, and it simultaneously lost ground in the entry-level market.

The rise and fall of Nezha offers a sobering lesson for China's EV industry: sales volume alone is not enough. Without technological barriers, brand equity, and stable cash flow, even once-leading players can fall rapidly from grace. Today, the name “Nezha” is more often seen on lists of failed EV startups than on sales leaderboards, becoming an unfinished and tragic chapter in the story of China’s electric vehicle revolution.