螞蟻金服的坎坷上市路：從「全球最大IPO」到監管風暴中的蟄伏

螞蟻集團的前身是2004年誕生的支付寶，最初僅是淘寶網的一項擔保支付功能。然而隨著中國移動支付的迅猛發展，支付寶逐漸脫離阿里體系，並於2014年正式成立螞蟻金服（後更名為螞蟻集團），發展為涵蓋支付、信貸、理財、保險等多元化業務的金融科技巨頭。

在其鼎盛時期，螞蟻的業務版圖令人矚目。支付寶的全球用戶超過13億，在中國的移動支付市場佔有率高達50%以上；旗下的花唄與借唄構成龐大的消費信貸網絡，高峰時年放貸規模突破2萬億元(人民幣)；餘額寶曾一度成為全球最大的貨幣基金，管理資金近2萬億元；芝麻信用則是中國最早的民間徵信體系之一。

這一系列成就推動螞蟻集團邁向IPO巔峰。2020年，公司計劃在上海與香港同步上市，估值一度飆升至4600億美元（約3.6萬億人民幣），甚至超越全球所有銀行，成為史上最大規模的首次公開募股（IPO）。

然而，就在螞蟻上市前48小時，中國監管機構於2020年11月3日突然叫停其IPO，震驚全球資本市場。背後原因錯綜複雜。首先，螞蟻雖打著科技企業的名號，但其核心業務實為高槓桿金融操作。以僅300億人民幣的資本金，撬動1.8萬億元的聯合貸款，風險實際上由合作銀行承擔。透過資產證券化（ABS）循環打包銷售貸款資產，實現類似2008年次貸危機的放大槓桿效應。

此外，螞蟻體量過於龐大，若發生系統性風險，可能牽動整個中國金融體系；與阿里巴巴之間錯綜複雜的關聯交易，也引發利益輸送的質疑；而支付寶在市場的壟斷地位亦被認為不利於公平競爭。

2020年底，中國人民銀行與銀保監會聯合約談螞蟻高層，要求其全面整改。2021年，螞蟻被迫改制為金融控股公司，接受更嚴格的資本監管。2023年7月，中國監管部門對其罰款71.23億元，這也被視為其整改階段的正式結束。

整改之後，螞蟻的業務大幅收縮。花唄與借唄被納入央行徵信系統，規模明顯縮減；餘額寶的管理規模與收益率雙雙下降；支付寶則回歸支付本業，剝離理財功能。2023年，馬雲放棄對螞蟻的實際控制權，其表決權降至50%以下，以符合監管合規要求。公司的估值亦從高峰時的4600億美元，跌至2024年的約1000至2000億美元，縮水逾六成。

面對內地市場成長瓶頸，螞蟻嘗試另闢蹊徑。2025年，公司計畫分拆海外業務「螞蟻國際」於香港上市，寄望實現「曲線救國」。螞蟻國際的業務重點包括：Alipay+ 跨境支付網絡，連接全球70個市場、服務17億用戶；「萬里匯」則為超過100萬家外貿企業提供金融解決方案，年交易額突破1000億美元。此外，螞蟻也積極布局穩定幣與區塊鏈支付，正在申請香港與新加坡的相關牌照。

不過挑戰依舊嚴峻。PayPal、Stripe 等國際巨頭早已在海外市場站穩腳跟，地緣政治風險亦可能對中國金融科技企業構成限制。美方對中資背景的警惕，無疑為螞蟻的全球化之路增添變數。

展望未來，螞蟻已從昔日的顛覆者，轉變為一間受到嚴格監管的「普通金融機構」，在中國市場的成長空間有限；而海外市場則成為唯一希望，但估值恐怕難以重返當年輝煌。螞蟻的浮沉，是中國金融監管演進的縮影，也提醒所有科技巨頭：在新的監管時代，唯有合規經營，方能持續生存。

Ant Group’s Bumpy Road to IPO: From “World’s Largest IPO” to Regulatory Hibernation

Ant Group, originally known as Alipay, was born in 2004 as a simple escrow payment feature for Taobao. However, as mobile payments in China rapidly evolved, Alipay gradually grew independent from the Alibaba ecosystem and officially became Ant Financial (later renamed Ant Group) in 2014. It expanded into a financial technology giant covering payments, consumer credit, wealth management, and insurance.

At its peak, Ant Group’s business scope was staggering. Alipay amassed over 1.3 billion users globally, with a market share of over 50% in China’s mobile payments sector. Its consumer credit services, Huabei and Jiebei, built a vast lending network, with total annual disbursements exceeding RMB 2 trillion. Yu’ebao became the largest money market fund in the world at one point, managing nearly RMB 2 trillion, while Zhima Credit emerged as one of China’s earliest private credit scoring systems.

These achievements propelled Ant Group toward what was expected to be a record-breaking IPO. In 2020, the company planned a dual listing in Shanghai and Hong Kong, with its valuation soaring to $460 billion (approximately RMB 3.6 trillion), surpassing all global banks and setting the stage for the largest IPO in history.

Yet, just 48 hours before its scheduled debut, Chinese regulators abruptly halted the IPO on November 3, 2020—sending shockwaves through global financial markets. The reasons behind this intervention were complex. Although Ant branded itself as a tech company, its core operations were in high-leverage financial products. With only RMB 30 billion in capital, it leveraged over RMB 1.8 trillion in joint loans, with much of the actual risk borne by partner banks. It also used asset-backed securities (ABS) to repackage and sell these loans, creating a leverage effect reminiscent of the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis.

Furthermore, Ant’s sheer size posed systemic risk. A failure within Ant could potentially destabilize China’s entire financial system. Its intricate related-party transactions with Alibaba raised concerns about unfair profit transfers, and Alipay’s dominance in the market was seen as a threat to fair competition.

By late 2020, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) summoned Ant’s executives and ordered sweeping reforms. In 2021, Ant was forced to restructure into a financial holding company, placing it under tighter capital and regulatory oversight. In July 2023, the company was fined RMB 7.123 billion, marking the official conclusion of its regulatory restructuring.

Post-reform, Ant’s business contracted significantly. Huabei and Jiebei were integrated into the central bank’s credit reporting system, with reduced loan limits. Yu’ebao shrank in both size and yield. Alipay returned to its roots as a pure payment platform, stripping out investment functions. In 2023, Jack Ma relinquished actual control of Ant, reducing his voting rights to below 50% to comply with regulatory requirements. The company's valuation also plummeted from $460 billion at its peak to between $100 billion and $200 billion by 2024—a decline of over 60%.

Facing a growth ceiling in the domestic market, Ant began exploring overseas opportunities. In 2025, the company announced plans to spin off and list its international business, Ant International, in Hong Kong—a move seen as a "curveball strategy" to revive its ambitions. Ant International focuses on Alipay+, a cross-border payment network connecting 70 markets and serving 1.7 billion users. Its WorldFirst platform offers financial solutions to over a million export enterprises, with annual transaction volumes exceeding $100 billion. Ant is also actively investing in stablecoins and blockchain-based payments, and is seeking licenses in Hong Kong and Singapore.

However, major challenges persist. Global giants like PayPal and Stripe have long secured strongholds in overseas markets. Geopolitical tensions may further restrict Chinese fintech firms, and U.S. scrutiny of Chinese-owned platforms adds uncertainty to Ant’s globalization efforts.

Looking ahead, Ant Group has transitioned from a bold disruptor to a tightly regulated “ordinary” financial institution, with limited room for growth within China. The overseas market remains its only viable frontier, though a return to its former valuation peak appears unlikely. The rise and fall of Ant Group mirrors the evolution of China’s financial regulatory environment, and serves as a cautionary tale for all tech giants: in a new era of oversight, regulatory compliance is the only path to sustainable survival.