中國經濟學家王小魯近日指出，中國目前仍有約七億人口的月收入在人民幣兩千元左右（約新台幣九千元、折合約二千六百元人民幣）以下。這一數據不僅引發社會廣泛關注，更凸顯中國與發達國家在收入水準上的巨大落差。根據王小魯的分析，即便是發達國家中收入最低者，其人均GDP也已達到約2.4萬美元，是中國當前水平的兩倍之多。這一觀點反映出中國經濟在總量之外，仍面臨著收入結構與分配體系方面的深層挑戰。

根據中國國家統計局2024年發布的數據，全國居民人均可支配收入為41,314元人民幣，換算下來月均約3,443元，名義增長5.3%，實際增長5.1%。但這一「平均數」掩蓋巨大差距：城市居民人均可支配收入高達54,188元，而農村居民僅為23,119元，月均不到兩千元。城鄉收入的鴻溝依然明顯。此外，收入的「中位數」僅為34,707元，約為平均數的84%，意味著大多數居民收入低於平均水平，也顯示少數高收入者拉高整體數值，而中低收入群體則佔據主體。

王小魯提到的「七億低收入人口」的說法，其實早有先例。2021年，北京師範大學中國收入分配研究院曾發表報告指出，中國月收入低於2000元的人口高達9.64億，雖然該數據後來遭到下架，但早在2020年，時任總理李克強也曾公開表示，中國有超過6億人月收入僅千元左右。這些數字彼此印證，顯示儘管中國已成為世界第二大經濟體，但收入結構仍極為不均。

再看中國居民的消費結構，就能進一步體會其生活壓力。2024年全國人均消費支出為28,227元，折合月均約2,352元，其中近三成用於食品、煙酒開支（29.8%），其次為居住支出（22.2%）與交通通信（14.1%）。這表明多數家庭的收入依舊主要用於基本生活所需，而教育、文化、娛樂等較高層次的消費仍屬奢侈。尤其是農村居民，人均消費僅為19,280元（月均1,607元），其中食品支出所佔比重更高，顯示其生活水平明顯滯後於城鎮地區。

雖然2025年第一季度中國經濟仍維持穩健增長，居民人均可支配收入同比增長5.5%，農村居民增速（6.2%）甚至高於城鎮居民（4.9%），但這種成長尚未有效化解結構性問題。中國經濟仍高度依賴投資與出口拉動，而內需不足、消費佔GDP比重偏低，與居民收入分配不均及社會保障體系不完善密切相關。

中國目前雖已擁有全球最大中等收入群體，約為4億人，但這一群體的內部結構十分脆弱。很多人的收入僅略高於中等門檻，稍受經濟波動即有可能跌落至低收入行列。例如在疫情期間，約有5000萬農民工與4000萬小型個體經營者收入大幅縮水，甚至跌回貧困線以下，暴露出該群體的脆弱性。

從長遠來看，中國需要面對的不只是如何提升人均收入水準，更是如何縮小收入差距、強化社會保障、完善公共服務，以支撐內需，實現更全面且可持續的發展。王小魯的觀點從另一面揭示中國經濟的現實困境——雖然總體規模已然龐大，但若居民生活未能真正改善，則「發展中國家」的本質仍未改變。唯有透過制度性改革，讓經濟成果惠及更廣大群體，才能真正邁向均衡與現代化的發展目標。

Chinese economist Wang Xiaolu recently pointed out that around 700 million people in China still earn less than 2,000 RMB per month (approximately 2,600 RMB when adjusted or around 9,000 NTD). This figure has sparked widespread public concern and highlights the significant income gap between China and developed nations. According to Wang’s analysis, even the lowest-income developed countries have a per capita GDP of about $24,000—roughly twice China's current level. His argument reveals the deeper structural challenges in China’s economy, beyond its sheer size, particularly in income distribution and allocation mechanisms.

According to data released by China’s National Bureau of Statistics in 2024, the national per capita disposable income stood at 41,314 RMB, which breaks down to about 3,443 RMB per month. This represents a nominal increase of 5.3% and a real growth of 5.1%. However, this “average” masks significant disparities: the per capita disposable income of urban residents reached 54,188 RMB, while rural residents earned only 23,119 RMB—less than 2,000 RMB per month. The urban-rural income gap remains pronounced. Moreover, the median income was only 34,707 RMB—about 84% of the average—indicating that most people earn less than the average, and that high-income groups disproportionately skew the overall data.

Wang Xiaolu’s mention of the "700 million low-income population" is not entirely new. In 2021, the China Institute for Income Distribution at Beijing Normal University released a report stating that over 964 million people in China earned less than 2,000 RMB per month. Although the report was later taken offline, then-Premier Li Keqiang similarly stated in 2020 that over 600 million people had a monthly income of just 1,000 RMB. These numbers reinforce each other and show that, despite China’s status as the world’s second-largest economy, income inequality remains deeply entrenched.

Looking at Chinese consumption patterns further reveals the financial pressures on ordinary households. In 2024, the national per capita consumption expenditure was 28,227 RMB, or about 2,352 RMB per month. Of that, nearly 30% was spent on food, tobacco, and alcohol (29.8%), followed by housing (22.2%) and transportation and communication (14.1%). This indicates that most families still spend the majority of their income on basic necessities, with little left for higher-level consumption such as education, culture, or entertainment. The situation is even more stark for rural residents, whose average consumption was only 19,280 RMB (about 1,607 RMB per month), with a higher proportion spent on food—highlighting their relatively low standard of living.

While China's economy maintained steady growth in the first quarter of 2025—with per capita disposable income rising 5.5% year-on-year, and rural income growing faster (6.2%) than that of urban areas (4.9%)—this growth has not resolved the underlying structural issues. China’s economic model remains heavily reliant on investment and exports, while domestic consumption contributes less to GDP. This is closely tied to income inequality and an underdeveloped social security system.

Despite having the world’s largest middle-income group—estimated at around 400 million people—the internal structure of this group is fragile. Many individuals earn only slightly above the middle-income threshold and are vulnerable to economic shocks. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, incomes of roughly 50 million migrant workers and 40 million small business owners were severely affected, with some falling back below the poverty line. This highlights the precarious nature of China’s middle-income demographic.

In the long run, China must address not only how to raise average income levels, but also how to reduce income disparities, strengthen social welfare, and improve public services to boost domestic demand and support sustainable development. Wang Xiaolu’s perspective underscores the broader dilemma facing China’s economy: while its overall scale is massive, if people’s livelihoods do not meaningfully improve, China’s status as a developing country remains unchanged. Only through systemic reform—ensuring that economic gains are more evenly shared—can the country truly progress toward balanced and modern development.