在中國市場，星巴克曾是不可撼動的咖啡王者。它以「第三空間」的理念結合高端品牌形象，深受都市白領和小資族群喜愛，門市被視為社交與工作的理想場所。然而，隨著市場競爭加劇與消費習慣轉變，星巴克的神話正逐漸崩塌，市佔率大幅下滑，甚至傳出高瓴資本擬以50至60億美元收購其中國業務，由高盛擔任財務顧問的消息。這一變局背後，反映的是星巴克一連串的戰略錯誤與本土品牌迅速崛起的現實。

首先，星巴克面對的是瑞幸咖啡與蜜雪冰城兩大本土勢力的夾擊。瑞幸透過「9.9元咖啡」引發價格革命，不僅大幅壓縮星巴克的價格優勢，還依靠APP、小程序與外賣平台，打造高效率的數位化銷售體系。截至2024年，瑞幸門市已達22,340家，遠超星巴克的7,685家，成為中國市佔率最高的咖啡品牌。另一方面，蜜雪冰城則以超低價格滲透三線以下城市，憑藉自建供應鏈與成本控制能力，打造出數量超過45,000家的龐大門市網絡。這兩大品牌在價格、通路與規模上形成壓倒性優勢，使星巴克原本佔據的34%市佔率，到2024年已銳減至14%。

在這場市場轉變中，星巴克的戰略猶豫成為致命傷。儘管其高層始終強調「不打價格戰」，但面對業績壓力又悄悄推出「19.9元一杯」、「49.9元三杯」等促銷活動，結果不但未能挽回流失的價格敏感型消費者，反而損害品牌的高端形象。其原本引以為傲的「第三空間」體驗，也因門市為追求坪效而縮減座位，甚至出現勸離客人等行為，讓消費者感受大打折扣。與此同時，新興品牌如M Stand、%Arabica提供更具設計感與氛圍的用餐空間，而瑞幸與庫迪則主打快取與外帶，使星巴克的「中間定位」陷入尷尬，不上不下。

創新不足也是星巴克失去市場主導權的重要原因。相比瑞幸一年推出百款新飲品的靈活策略，星巴克2024年僅推出78款新品，且多數反響平平，甚至出現如「紅燒肉拿鐵」這類引起爭議的產品。其一貫使用的「綠杯」、「節日限定」行銷手法，也逐漸難以吸引追求新鮮感與本土文化的年輕消費者。

營運層面，星巴克的財務狀況也亮起紅燈。2024年在中國的營收雖達30億美元，但同店銷售額連續四季下滑，淨利潤更暴跌35%。原本被寄予厚望的下沉市場策略，也未帶來預期成效——新門市多開設於低線城市，卻無法撼動蜜雪冰城等強敵地位，導致許多新店出現虧損。此外，星巴克在全球與中國區的管理層頻繁更換，使得整體策略搖擺不定，缺乏連貫與執行力。

面對重重困境，星巴克選擇引入高瓴資本，視其為最後一搏。高瓴曾成功協助百勝中國（肯德基、必勝客）完成數位化轉型，若能導入類似模式，或有望幫助星巴克改善供應鏈與線上經營效率。同時，高瓴也可能推動星巴克在下沉市場採取「小店＋快取」的新營運模式，並重塑品牌形象，推出更具性價比的新產品，以迎戰瑞幸與庫迪等競爭對手。

然而，即使有高瓴的資金與資源支持，星巴克的轉型仍充滿挑戰。如今的中國咖啡市場早已形成強烈的品牌與成本壁壘。瑞幸與蜜雪冰城不僅占據消費者心智，也建立了難以撼動的營運優勢。星巴克若不能徹底拋下高端包袱、擁抱本土化需求，很可能仍難逆轉頹勢。

總結而言，星巴克在中國的起落，實質上反映一個時代的轉變。它的成功是建立在城市化、消費升級與新興中產階級崛起的基礎上，但當市場重心轉向性價比與效率，星巴克若不改變其根本戰略，即使有外部資本加持，也可能走向邊緣化。這場收購，或許不是星巴克中國的「救贖」，而是象徵著一個消費時代的終結。

In the Chinese market, Starbucks was once the undisputed king of coffee. By promoting the concept of a “third space” alongside its premium brand image, it became a favorite among urban white-collar workers and the middle class. Its stores were seen as ideal places for both socializing and work. However, with intensifying market competition and shifting consumer habits, the Starbucks myth is gradually crumbling. Its market share has significantly declined, and recent reports suggest that Hillhouse Capital is planning to acquire Starbucks China for $5 to $6 billion, with Goldman Sachs acting as the financial advisor. Behind this dramatic turn lies a series of strategic missteps by Starbucks and the rapid rise of domestic competitors.

Foremost among these rivals are Luckin Coffee and Mixue Bingcheng. Luckin launched a price revolution with its “9.9 yuan coffee” campaign, drastically undercutting Starbucks' pricing advantage. It also leveraged mobile apps, mini-programs, and food delivery platforms to build a highly efficient digital sales ecosystem. By 2024, Luckin had 22,340 stores—far surpassing Starbucks’ 7,685—and had become the largest coffee brand in China by market share. Meanwhile, Mixue Bingcheng expanded aggressively into lower-tier cities with ultra-low prices, offering 2 yuan ice cream, 4 yuan lemon water, and 6 yuan milk tea. With a self-built supply chain and strict cost control, it now operates over 45,000 stores. Together, these two brands created overwhelming advantages in pricing, distribution, and scale. As a result, Starbucks’ market share plunged from 34% in 2019 to just 14% in 2024.

Amid this market shift, Starbucks’ strategic hesitation proved fatal. Although its executives repeatedly stated that the company would not engage in a price war, it quietly launched discount promotions such as “19.9 yuan per cup” and “49.9 yuan for three cups.” These measures failed to win back price-sensitive customers and simultaneously diluted Starbucks’ high-end brand image. The “third space” experience that it once prided itself on was also compromised, as many stores reduced seating to increase efficiency and even began politely asking customers to leave, leading to a notable drop in customer satisfaction. Meanwhile, newer brands like M Stand and %Arabica offered more aesthetically pleasing spaces, while Luckin and Cotti Coffee focused on speed and convenience. Trapped between premium ambiance and fast service, Starbucks’ middle-ground positioning became awkward and unappealing.

A lack of innovation also contributed to Starbucks’ fall from market dominance. While Luckin introduced over 100 new drinks in 2024 alone, Starbucks only released 78, many of which failed to generate buzz. Some, like the controversial “braised pork latte,” drew criticism. Marketing tactics such as the classic green cup and seasonal specials have become stale and less appealing to younger consumers who crave novelty and local relevance.

Operationally, Starbucks’ financial performance has also faltered. Though its China revenue reached $3 billion in 2024, same-store sales fell for four consecutive quarters, and net profit plunged by 35%. Its strategy of expanding into lower-tier cities failed to deliver the expected results. Many new stores in these areas could not compete effectively with established local brands like Mixue Bingcheng, leading to mounting losses. Frequent leadership changes both globally and within China have also led to inconsistent strategies and a lack of executional clarity.

Faced with mounting challenges, Starbucks turned to Hillhouse Capital, hoping to stage a comeback. Hillhouse had previously helped Yum China (KFC, Pizza Hut) complete a successful digital transformation. If similar strategies are applied, Starbucks might improve its supply chain and digital operations. Hillhouse may also help the brand adopt a new “small-store + takeaway” model tailored to lower-tier markets and revamp its product lines with more affordable offerings to better compete with Luckin and Cotti Coffee.

However, even with Hillhouse’s capital and resources, Starbucks’ transformation will not be easy. China’s coffee market now has entrenched brand loyalties and significant cost barriers. Luckin and Mixue Bingcheng not only dominate consumer awareness but also possess formidable operational advantages. Unless Starbucks is willing to shed its high-end legacy and fully embrace localized needs, a true reversal may remain out of reach.

In conclusion, Starbucks’ rise and fall in China reflect a broader shift in consumer trends. Its early success was built on urbanization, consumption upgrades, and the rise of the middle class. But now, with a market increasingly focused on affordability and efficiency, if Starbucks fails to fundamentally adapt its strategy, external funding alone won’t be enough to save it. This acquisition may not mark the redemption of Starbucks China, but rather the end of an era in consumer culture.