美團優選的全面撤退，猶如一場突如其來的寒潮，席捲整個社區團購產業鏈。2025年6月，美團官方突然宣布關閉美團優選在大陸的部分虧損業務，這場大規模撤離不僅讓超過2000萬名註冊用戶措手不及，更導致約5萬名地推、倉儲與配送人員直接失業。這場看似迅速的崩塌，其實是經過精密計算與漸進式實施的戰略性退場，也映照出當前中國互聯網巨頭在新零售與消費賽道上面臨的共同困局。

美團優選於2020年7月正式進軍社區團購，當時高舉高打、意氣風發，提出「千城計畫」的野心。三年間，美團在該業務上投入超過300億元人民幣，單季最大虧損達109億元。儘管創辦人王興曾將其視為「十年一遇的機會」，但實際經營中卻暴露出極高的損耗與運營成本。生鮮品類天然損耗率高達15%至20%，再加上冷鏈運輸與倉儲成本，導致毛利率長期處於負值。此外，過度依賴補貼的模式也拖垮可持續性，新人全返、1元秒殺等活動雖吸引用戶，卻導致每位用戶獲取成本高達80元。更雪上加霜的是，監管機構頒布的「九不得」政策明確禁止價格戰與不正當競爭，徹底封鎖企業通過低價補貼跑馬圈地的路徑。

這場撤退並非一次性完成，而是分階段有秩序地實施。2022年第二季起，美團優選開始關閉西北與東北三省等低效市場，裁撤三成前置倉；第三季進一步撤出長三角、珠三角以外的二線城市；到2024年春節前，只剩北上廣深等核心一線城市還在運營，但最終也宣告全線終止。內部流出的《光年行動執行手冊》顯示，美團要求各地必須完成「三清」：清庫存、清帳款、清勞務關係，務求在最短時間內將損失降至最低。

這場撤退造成五大產業鏈的連鎖斷裂。首先是供應商體系的崩潰，例如山東壽光多家蔬菜合作社集體控告美團，追討高達2.3億元的貨款；其次是60萬名社區團長中有近半轉投抖音本地生活等平台；第三是物流資源過剩導致同城配送市場價格暴跌，多地即時配單價下跌四成；第四是人力資源市場的震盪，特別是35歲以上人員再就業困難重重；最後，儲存在美團優選平台的2000萬用戶數據與消費畫像也成為無法轉化的沉沒資產。

這劇變標誌著美團整體零售策略的重大調整。在關停美團優選的同時，美團反而將更多資源投入到「美團買菜」業務上。這背後代表的是從「低頻、高補貼、高損耗」的社區團購，轉向「高頻、低損耗、即時流量協同」的即時零售模式。雖然這一策略轉型更貼近用戶需求，但轉型代價不小。公告發布當天，美團股價單日下跌11%，市值蒸發900億港元，同時為拼多多旗下的「多多買菜」等競品騰出空間。

社區團購1.0時代的終結，也揭示整個商業模式的結構性缺陷。從最初的補貼擴張到後來的倉儲壓力、流量無法轉化，再到監管紅線，美團的失敗似乎早已埋下伏筆。事實證明，僅靠燒錢與補貼無法克服生鮮電商的盈利魔咒。與此同時，新的業態開始浮現，如以錢大媽為代表的區域化輕資產模式，以及盒馬主導的會員制選品超市，這些模式更符合當前消費者對品質與效率的雙重追求。

美團優選的撤退，或許只是行業大洗牌的開始。它留下的不只是數據與倉庫的空殼，更是對整個行業的深刻警醒：當巨頭都無法承受虧損壓力時，這場由風口捧起的產業，又將何去何從？如今，燒錢換增長的時代已經過去，接下來的社區零售市場，恐怕需要的不只是資金與規模，更是耐心、策略與真正符合市場邏輯的運營智慧。

The full-scale withdrawal of Meituan Youxuan struck like a sudden cold wave, sweeping across the entire community group-buying supply chain. In June 2025, Meituan officially announced the closure of several loss-making operations under Meituan Youxuan nationwide. This large-scale retreat caught over 20 million registered users off guard and directly resulted in the unemployment of about 50,000 ground promoters, warehouse workers, and delivery staff. What seemed to be a sudden collapse was in fact a strategically calculated and gradually executed exit, reflecting the broader predicament faced by Chinese internet giants in the sectors of new retail and consumer services.

Meituan Youxuan formally entered the community group-buying market in July 2020 with high ambition, launching the so-called “Thousand Cities Plan.” Over the course of three years, Meituan invested more than 30 billion RMB in this business, with the largest quarterly loss reaching 10.9 billion RMB. Although founder Wang Xing once hailed it as a "once-in-a-decade opportunity," the business quickly exposed severe issues such as high spoilage rates and enormous operating costs. Fresh products naturally suffer spoilage rates between 15% and 20%, and the costs associated with cold chain logistics and storage kept gross margins consistently in the red. Furthermore, an overreliance on subsidies undermined long-term sustainability—promotions such as full rebates for new users and flash sales for just one yuan drew in customers but drove customer acquisition costs as high as 80 RMB per person. Making matters worse, the "Nine Prohibitions" policy issued by regulatory authorities explicitly banned price wars and unfair competition, effectively cutting off Meituan's ability to rely on low-price subsidies to gain market share.

The retreat was not executed all at once, but was carried out in a phased and orderly manner. Starting from the second quarter of 2022, Meituan Youxuan began closing operations in low-efficiency markets such as the northwest and the three northeastern provinces, shutting down 30% of its forward warehouses. In the third quarter, it further exited second-tier cities outside of the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta. By the time of the 2024 Spring Festival, only the core first-tier cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen remained operational—but even those were ultimately shut down. An internal manual titled "Operation Lightyear Execution Handbook" revealed that Meituan required all regions to complete the “Three Clears”: clearing inventory, clearing accounts receivable, and clearing labor relationships, all with the aim of minimizing losses in the shortest possible time.

This withdrawal caused a chain reaction across five major sectors of the supply chain. First, the supplier system collapsed: for example, several vegetable cooperatives in Shouguang, Shandong, collectively sued Meituan to reclaim payments totaling up to 230 million RMB. Second, nearly half of the 600,000 community group-buying leaders shifted to platforms such as Douyin Local Life. Third, the surplus in logistics resources led to a sharp drop in intra-city delivery prices, with instant order rates falling by 40% in many regions. Fourth, the labor market experienced disruptions, especially with workers over 35 struggling to find new employment. Finally, the consumer data and behavioral profiles of 20 million users stored on the Meituan Youxuan platform became a sunk asset with no means of conversion.

This dramatic shift signifies a major overhaul in Meituan’s overall retail strategy. While Meituan Youxuan was being shuttered, the company simultaneously funneled more resources into its "Meituan Grocery" business. This move reflects a strategic pivot from "low-frequency, high-subsidy, high-spoilage" community group-buying toward a "high-frequency, low-spoilage, instant retail traffic synergy" model. Although this transformation better aligns with user needs, it came at a high cost. On the day the announcement was made, Meituan's stock plummeted 11% in a single trading day, wiping out 90 billion HKD in market value and creating more room for competitors like Pinduoduo's Duoduo Maicai to grow.

The end of the Community Group-Buying 1.0 era reveals the structural flaws of the business model itself. From its early days of expansion via subsidies to later logistical burdens and poor traffic conversion, and eventually the regulatory red lines, Meituan’s failure appears to have been foreshadowed all along. It is now evident that burning cash and offering discounts alone cannot overcome the profitability curse of fresh e-commerce. Meanwhile, new formats have begun to emerge—such as the regionally focused, asset-light model exemplified by Qian Dama, and the curated membership-based supermarket model led by Hema—which better match today’s consumer demands for both quality and efficiency.

The withdrawal of Meituan Youxuan may be just the beginning of a major reshuffling across the industry. What remains is not just empty warehouses and inactive user data, but a sobering lesson for the entire sector: if even the giants cannot bear the weight of sustained losses, where will this trend-driven industry go next? The era of burning money for growth is over. The future of the community retail market will likely require not just capital and scale, but also patience, strategy, and operational wisdom that truly aligns with market logic.