中國地產龍頭之一的萬科（Vanke）近日公告預計2025年上半年將錄得淨虧損約100億元至120億元人民幣，扣除非經常性損益後的虧損規模亦高達95億至115億元，這不僅是萬科歷史上的罕見巨額虧損，也象徵著中國房地產市場寒冬未退、企業轉型困境仍在加劇。

萬科自2023年起便已大幅加快資產處置與業務收縮的節奏，包括出售非核心資產、轉讓子公司股權、變賣商辦物業，甚至將部分城市更新項目或代建項目權益釋出。這些舉措本意是為回籠現金、減輕債務壓力與維持流動性。然而，從最新財報預告來看，即使持續「賣身自救」，萬科的虧損仍然未見明顯收斂，反而呈現進一步惡化的跡象。

其虧損的核心原因可從幾個層面觀察。首先是銷售規模大幅萎縮。隨著房地產整體市場需求疲軟，萬科的合同銷售額自2022年以來呈現持續下滑，導致主營收入大幅縮水，毛利率也因價格下行而遭到擠壓。其次是資產減值損失持續擴大。過去大量投入的土地儲備與項目在當前市場估值體系下大幅貶值，不得不提列巨額減值準備，進一步拖累帳面利潤。此外，萬科作為過去高度依賴負債擴張的企業，其利息支出與融資成本居高不下，尤其是在信用評級下調、融資渠道受限的情況下，財務壓力幾近極限。

若萬科資不償債最終走向破產，這對中國整體經濟與金融系統將構成重大衝擊。首先是市場信心的崩潰。萬科作為中國房地產市場中最具代表性的國有背景房企之一，其破產將動搖市場對於「國企不會倒」的認知，帶動一波連鎖的信任危機，進一步引爆更多中小型房企與供應商的信用違約潮。

其次是金融系統的壓力擴大。萬科擁有數千億級別的銀行貸款與債券融資，若其違約，將波及多家商業銀行、信託與保險機構的資產安全，加劇金融機構的不良率上升與流動性風險，甚至可能觸發地產金融相關理財產品的贖回潮，引發系統性風險。

再來是對居民與上下游企業的波及。萬科手上仍有大量在建項目與未交付住房，一旦破產將導致大批購房者陷入「爛尾樓」困局，引發群體性維權事件與社會穩定問題。同時，其上游供應鏈包括建材、裝潢、設備商與代建服務商等，均仰賴萬科為核心訂單來源，若萬科資金斷裂，將造成大量企業訂單流失與應收帳款壞帳，連鎖效應難以估量。

從宏觀角度看，萬科之困亦反映中國房地產去槓桿與調控政策中的「矯枉過正」風險。在「三道紅線」與嚴格限貸限售政策下，房企集體資金鏈緊縮，投資與信心陷入低谷。若缺乏有力的政策轉向與市場回暖動能，即使如萬科這樣具備品牌、資產與經驗的企業亦難以突圍，這對中國的經濟成長、地方政府財政與居民資產信心均構成深遠壓力。

總的來看，萬科的巨額虧損與潛在危機不僅是一家企業的經營困境，而是一場關乎中國房地產政策、經濟結構轉型與金融安全的系統性風暴的前兆。若政府與監管部門未能及時採取穩定預期與提供支撐的措施，可能將迎來中國房地產市場真正的臨界點。

Vanke, one of China's leading real estate giants, recently announced that it expects to report a net loss of approximately RMB 10 to 12 billion for the first half of 2025. Even after excluding non-recurring gains and losses, the company anticipates a net loss of RMB 9.5 to 11.5 billion. This marks a rare and substantial financial setback in Vanke’s history and highlights the ongoing chill in China's property market as well as the increasing difficulties companies face in transitioning through this downturn.

Since 2023, Vanke has significantly accelerated its asset disposals and business downsizing efforts. These have included selling non-core assets, transferring stakes in subsidiaries, liquidating commercial properties, and relinquishing interests in urban redevelopment and construction management projects. The goal behind these actions has been to recover cash, alleviate debt pressure, and maintain liquidity. However, based on its latest earnings forecast, these self-rescue measures have not significantly mitigated losses; instead, the financial situation appears to be deteriorating further.

The core reasons behind Vanke’s mounting losses can be attributed to several factors. First and foremost is the dramatic decline in sales volume. As market demand continues to weaken across the property sector, Vanke's contracted sales have consistently fallen since 2022, leading to shrinking primary revenues and compressed profit margins due to declining housing prices. Secondly, asset impairment losses have worsened. The company’s once-sizeable land reserves and development projects have depreciated significantly under current market valuations, forcing Vanke to record large-scale impairment charges that drag down overall profits. Moreover, having long relied on debt-fueled expansion, Vanke now faces high interest payments and financing costs. With credit ratings downgraded and funding channels narrowing, its financial strain has reached a critical level.

If Vanke were to become insolvent and eventually file for bankruptcy, the consequences for China’s broader economy and financial system could be profound. First would be a collapse in market confidence. As one of the most prominent developers with a quasi-state background, Vanke’s failure would shatter the long-held belief that “state-backed firms won’t fail.” This could trigger a cascade of trust crises and prompt a new wave of defaults among smaller developers and their suppliers.

Second, the financial sector would come under increased stress. Vanke has amassed hundreds of billions of yuan in bank loans and bond financing. A default could impact the balance sheets of numerous commercial banks, trust companies, and insurance firms—raising non-performing loan ratios and liquidity risks. This could even spark a wave of redemptions from property-linked wealth management products, compounding systemic financial risks.

Third, the fallout would ripple through homeowners and the broader supply chain. Vanke still holds a vast portfolio of under-construction and undelivered properties. A bankruptcy would leave thousands of homebuyers facing “unfinished apartments,” potentially inciting mass protests and social instability. Meanwhile, its upstream suppliers—including building materials companies, equipment providers, decorators, and contractors—heavily depend on Vanke for business. A funding freeze would lead to order cancellations and unpaid invoices, with unpredictable ripple effects throughout the supply chain.

On a macro level, Vanke’s crisis also reflects the broader risk of “overcorrection” in China’s property de-leveraging and regulatory policies. Measures such as the “three red lines” and stringent lending and sales restrictions have squeezed liquidity across the industry, crushing investment confidence and pushing even major players to the brink. Without a meaningful policy shift or market rebound, even firms with strong brands, assets, and experience—like Vanke—may find survival difficult. This poses deep challenges for China’s economic growth, local government revenues, and consumer asset confidence.

In conclusion, Vanke’s massive losses and looming risks are not merely signs of a single company’s operational woes. They are indicative of a systemic storm that threatens to engulf China’s real estate sector, its financial system, and its economic stability. If regulators and policymakers fail to act swiftly to stabilize expectations and provide meaningful support, the country may soon reach a true tipping point in its real estate crisis.