市值蒸發超過350億元，中國的「麵包一哥」桃李麵包為何賣不動了？

桃李麵包（股票代碼：603866），作為中國短保麵包行業的龍頭企業，自1997年成立以來，便憑藉「中央工廠 + 批發」的商業模式迅速擴張，並於2015年登陸A股市場。當年，其市值一度突破400億元人民幣，風光無限，被業界譽為「麵包一哥」。桃李的核心競爭力來自於三個方面：其一是高性價比，主打3至5元(人民幣)的低價策略，迅速打入大眾消費市場；其二是強調新鮮健康，主營保質期僅3到7天的短保產品；其三是極高的渠道滲透率，截至2023年，其終端網點超過30萬家，遍及全國各大超市與便利店，如永輝、全家等。

然而，自2024年起，這家昔日的明星企業業績連年下滑，至2025年6月，其市值已蒸發超過350億元，股價較巔峰時期幾乎腰斬。桃李麵包到底怎麼了？

首先，是消費環境惡化導致其低價策略失效。隨著宏觀經濟增速放緩，居民可支配收入下降，「消費降級」現象日益明顯。即便桃李產品價格不高，仍敵不過更便宜的散裝麵包或家庭自製食品。此外，短保產品的依賴場景（如便利店早餐）也受到外賣和社區團購的替代，終端銷售出現疲軟。

其次，競爭態勢急遽升級，桃李的市場被多方勢力侵蝕。一方面，便利店的自有品牌迅速崛起，像便利蜂與羅森等均推出價格更具優勢的短保麵包，分流桃李原本穩固的客群。另一方面，新興的網紅現制品牌如「爸爸糖」、「幸福西餅」以現做現吃、新鮮健康為賣點，迅速切入高端市場。同時，國際巨頭如墨西哥賓堡、日本山崎麵包也大舉加碼中國市場，擴產提速，直接壓縮桃李的市場空間。

第三，原材料價格持續上漲，使桃李麵包的盈利能力受到重創。2024年，作為主要成本來源的麵粉和油脂價格同比上漲了15%至20%，但桃李難以同步提價，因為其核心客群對價格極為敏感。結果，2024年桃李的毛利率驟降至25.3%，相比2019年的39.1%有明顯下滑。

第四，是渠道優勢不再明顯，企業擴張面臨瓶頸。傳統商超渠道萎縮明顯，尤其永輝等大賣場關店潮頻現，而桃李在新零售領域如社區團購與直播電商上的布局仍然不足。此外，其南方市場拓展乏力，收入結構依然高度依賴東北與華北地區，兩地銷售佔比超過60%，區域集中度過高，抗風險能力較弱。

面對連年下滑的業績，市場與投資者對桃李的信心逐漸動搖。2024年，公司營收同比下降8.7%，淨利潤暴跌42%，多家機構投資者開始撤退，包括高瓴資本與社保基金等重量級股東也於2024年開始減倉。同時，整體包裝麵包行業的增速已大幅放緩，由2018年的12%跌至如今不足5%，行業紅利接近天花板。

為扭轉頹勢，桃李麵包也展開一系列應對策略。在產品上，推出「零添加」系列以對標健康消費趨勢，並嘗試開發保質期達30天的長保產品，以減輕渠道庫存壓力；在渠道上，桃李積極擴展社區團購平台，如與美團優選、多多買菜合作，並嘗試進入輕食場景，與瑞幸、庫迪咖啡聯名合作；在成本方面，公司計劃於新疆設廠，通過自建面粉供應基地來降低原材料採購成本。

儘管桃李開始調整策略，但未來挑戰依然嚴峻。若仍無法擺脫對低價策略的依賴，其品牌可能逐步淪為平庸；更需警惕外資品牌與區域競爭對手的進一步擠壓，特別是在南方與一線城市的市占率仍較薄弱。

總體而言，桃李麵包當下所面臨的困境，實為中國整個快消品行業轉型陣痛的縮影——低價紅利消失，消費者行為分層明顯，渠道模式正在重塑。桃李若希望重回增長軌道，必須跳出「麵包代工廠」的角色，真正建立品牌價值。這場陣痛難以避免，但若能成功轉型，其作為行業先行者的地位仍可能得以延續。對投資者而言，當前或許是觀望時機。建議密切關注2025年第二季度財報，以驗證渠道改革與新品策略的實際效果。若其健康新品線能夠實現放量增長，桃李或許仍有翻身的可能。

Market Value Plummets by Over 35 Billion Yuan: Why Has “Bread King” Taoli Bread Stopped Selling?

Taoli Bread (Stock Code: 603866), the leading enterprise in China’s short shelf-life bread industry, has enjoyed a prominent position since its founding in 1997. With its “centralized factory + wholesale” model, the company expanded rapidly and went public on the A-share market in 2015. At its peak, Taoli’s market value exceeded 40 billion yuan, earning it the industry nickname “Bread King.” Its core strengths lay in three areas: highly cost-effective pricing (typically 3–5 yuan per package), a focus on freshness and health with products lasting only 3 to 7 days, and vast distribution coverage, with over 300,000 retail points across China by 2023, including major supermarket and convenience store chains like Yonghui and FamilyMart.

However, starting in 2024, this once-glorious company began a continuous decline. By June 2025, its market value had dropped by over 35 billion yuan, and its stock price was nearly halved from its peak. What exactly happened to Taoli Bread?

The first major issue is that deteriorating consumer conditions have rendered its low-price strategy ineffective. With China’s overall economic growth slowing and disposable incomes shrinking, “consumption downgrading” has become widespread. Even though Taoli’s prices remain low, they have been undercut by cheaper bulk bread or homemade alternatives. Moreover, demand for short shelf-life products—which relied heavily on use cases like breakfast from convenience stores—has weakened, as more consumers opt for food delivery or group buying from local communities.

Second, the competitive landscape has intensified dramatically, eroding Taoli’s market share. On one front, private-label bread products from convenience stores such as Bianlifeng and Lawson have emerged with even more competitive pricing, attracting many of Taoli’s original customers. Simultaneously, trendy new brands like “Dad Sugar” and “Happiness Cake” are targeting the premium segment with a focus on freshness and in-store preparation. Adding to the pressure are international giants such as Mexico’s Bimbo and Japan’s Yamazaki, both of which have ramped up investment and production in China, squeezing Taoli’s share of the pie.

Third, rising raw material costs have dealt a heavy blow to profitability. In 2024, prices of key inputs like flour and edible oils surged by 15% to 20% year-over-year. However, Taoli was unable to raise prices in tandem due to the high price sensitivity of its customer base. As a result, the company’s gross profit margin plummeted to 25.3% in 2024, a sharp decline from 39.1% in 2019.

Fourth, Taoli’s once-formidable channel advantage is no longer effective. Traditional supermarket channels have been weakening, with large chains like Yonghui closing stores at scale. Meanwhile, Taoli has lagged in adapting to emerging retail models such as community group buying and livestream e-commerce. Its expansion into southern China remains lackluster, with over 60% of its revenue still dependent on the northeastern and northern regions, highlighting its regional imbalance and vulnerability to market fluctuations.

As performance continues to decline year after year, investor confidence has eroded. In 2024, revenue fell by 8.7% year-over-year, and net profit plummeted by 42%. Major institutional investors, including Hillhouse Capital and China’s Social Security Fund, began to reduce their holdings. At the same time, the growth rate of China’s packaged bread industry has slowed dramatically—from 12% in 2018 to under 5% in recent years—suggesting that the sector may be nearing a growth ceiling.

In response to its deteriorating performance, Taoli has launched a number of countermeasures. On the product side, the company rolled out a “zero additive” series to align with health-conscious trends and is experimenting with long shelf-life bread (up to 30 days) to reduce inventory pressure on distributors. On the channel side, Taoli is actively partnering with community group-buying platforms like Meituan Select and Pinduoduo’s grocery service. It is also entering light meal scenarios through collaborations with coffee brands like Luckin Coffee and Cotti Coffee. To reduce costs, Taoli has plans to build a flour production base in Xinjiang, aiming to lower its raw material procurement expenses through vertical integration.

Despite these adjustments, the road ahead remains challenging. If the company cannot shed its dependence on a low-price strategy, it risks becoming an ordinary brand with diminishing relevance. It must also be wary of further encroachment by foreign and regional competitors, especially given its weaker presence in first-tier cities and southern markets.

In essence, Taoli’s current struggles reflect broader structural pain across China’s fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) sector. The era of low-price dividends is ending, consumer behavior is fragmenting, and distribution models are undergoing fundamental change. For Taoli to return to a growth trajectory, it must transcend its role as merely a “bread manufacturer” and evolve into a true brand with strong value propositions. While the transformation process will inevitably be painful, success could restore its position as an industry pioneer.

For investors, this may be a time for caution and close observation. Monitoring Taoli’s Q2 2025 financial report will be key to assessing whether its channel reform and product innovation strategies are bearing fruit. Should its new health-focused product lines gain traction, the company may yet have a chance at a turnaround.