曾被譽為「最賺錢地鐵」的深圳地鐵，如今卻陷入鉅額虧損的泥淖，五年間累計虧損高達334億元人民幣。這家曾是中國城市軌道交通領域的資優生，竟然在短短幾年內，從穩健盈利的模範生，變成了財務風暴的風眼。究竟是什麼原因，讓深圳地鐵從神壇跌落，甚至被網民戲稱為「萬科的接盤俠」？這背後，正是國企與民企聯姻的複雜利益結構，以及戰略投資轉型中的一連串錯誤判斷，導致國有資產陷入巨大風險。

一、從地鐵運營商到投資大鱷：失焦的多元化

深圳地鐵作為深圳市政府全資控股的國有企業，其核心職能本是城市軌道建設與營運。然而，自2016年開始，隨著手握大量資金與政府背景，深圳地鐵不再滿足於「修地鐵、賣地鐵廣告」的穩健營收，而是高調轉向多元化發展，尤其是在地產與金融投資領域頻頻出手。最具爭議的，莫過於2017年接手萬科，成為其最大股東。這場「國進民退」式的收購，原被外界視為穩定民營龍頭、確保城市房地產市場穩定的戰略舉措。然而，萬科股價長期低迷、地產市場進入下行週期，讓深圳地鐵這筆看似風險可控的投資，成吞噬財報利潤的黑洞。截至2024年底，深圳地鐵持有萬科約27.18%的股份，按比例認列134億虧損，並對投資減持200億元，全年損334.61億元。不僅如此，其在產業基金、物業投資、城市更新等非主營領域也廣泛涉足，這些投資在房地產景氣退潮、金融市場波動中幾乎全面失利。

二、「地鐵+地產」模式崩塌：曾經的金鑰，如今的枷鎖

深圳地鐵曾是「地鐵+地產」開發模式的成功範例。這種模式下，地鐵沿線土地的開發權與運營權捆綁，地鐵公司可將沿線地價升值變現，用以補貼高昂的基建與運營成本。深圳早年土地供應充裕，政策支持明確，使得這一模式快速積累資本與土地儲備，成就「地鐵賺錢神話」。然而，進入2020年後，土地市場遇冷、房地產監管收緊，深圳市區可供開發土地減少，「地鐵+地產」模式失去最重要的現金流來源。已動工或預期收益的項目遭遇延遲甚至爛尾，使得深圳地鐵面臨雙重困境：基建投入持續擴張，房地產變現卻越來越難。據不完全統計，深圳地鐵截至2024年累計擁有近70個房地產項目，但開發進度緩慢，不少項目仍處於前期審批或資金困境之中。隨著債務壓力攀升，公司無法靠地產回補資金缺口，最終導致資產負債表急速惡化。

三、營運壓力與債務雪球：主業也無法倖免

即便回歸地鐵主業，深圳地鐵的營運壓力也日益沉重。截至2024年，深圳地鐵運營總里程超過500公里，年均維護與運營成本高達上百億元，而票價收入遠不足以覆蓋。事實上，中國地鐵普遍虧損，票價收入難以覆蓋高昂的運營成本與資產折舊。深圳曾因龐大的地鐵人口紅利，在票務與廣告上有所盈利，但隨著人流增長放緩與商業廣告市場萎縮，這些收入來源逐漸式微。再加上過去數年疫情對客流與營收造成重大衝擊，深圳地鐵的主營業務實際上早已入不敷出。與此同時，過度擴張留下的債務雪球也開始滾動。根據年報，深圳地鐵目前總負債已超過4100億元，債務償還壓力極大。即使部分為政策性貸款或市政債支持，但利息與流動性風險已對其財報造成長期傷害。

四、國企與民企的「聯姻困局」

外界普遍認為，深圳地鐵陷入虧損泥潭的一大根源，是其與萬科這樁「聯姻」。當初收購萬科股份，名義上是「保障城市主體地位，穩定戰略資產」，但實際上卻讓深圳地鐵背上地產行業周期波動的全部風險。在房地產去槓桿與市場冷卻背景下，萬科股價不斷探底，現金流問題頻現，甚至傳出「暴雷風險」。作為最大股東的深圳地鐵，不僅股權投資虧損，還被迫多次「輸血」，成為市場眼中的「接盤俠」。這也引發外界對國企是否應該參與市場化風險投資的廣泛討論。

Once hailed as "the most profitable metro system," the Shenzhen Metro has now plunged into a quagmire of massive losses, with a cumulative deficit of 33.4 billion yuan (RMB) over just five years. Once considered a model student in China's urban rail transit sector, Shenzhen Metro has, in a few short years, fallen from the pedestal of financial stability to become the eye of a fiscal storm. What caused this dramatic fall, and why has it earned the mocking title of “Vanke’s bag-holder” among netizens? The answer lies in the complex web of interests between state-owned and private enterprises, as well as a series of misjudged strategic investments that have pushed this state asset into significant risk.

1. From Metro Operator to Investment Giant: The Pitfalls of Diversification

As a fully state-owned enterprise under the Shenzhen municipal government, Shenzhen Metro was originally tasked with constructing and operating the city’s rail transit system. However, starting in 2016, armed with substantial capital and strong government backing, the company began to drift away from its core business. It aggressively expanded into property development and financial investments.

The most controversial move came in 2017, when Shenzhen Metro became the largest shareholder of real estate giant Vanke. This "state advances as private retreats" acquisition was initially seen as a strategic step to stabilize the real estate market and protect a key private player. But with Vanke’s share price stagnating and the entire property sector entering a downturn, the investment became a black hole for Shenzhen Metro’s profits.

As of the end of 2024, Shenzhen Metro held a 27.18% stake in Vanke, incurring a proportional loss of 13.4 billion yuan and reducing its investment by 20 billion yuan overall. The year’s total loss reached 33.46 billion yuan. Beyond that, Shenzhen Metro’s broad forays into industrial funds, property management, and urban renewal projects also suffered due to the cooling real estate market and financial instability.

2. Collapse of the “Metro + Real Estate” Model: From Golden Key to Shackles

Shenzhen Metro was once the poster child of the “metro + real estate” model. Under this scheme, the company leveraged its development rights along metro lines to profit from rising land values, using this income to offset the enormous costs of infrastructure and operations. In the early years, with abundant land supply and clear policy support, the model fueled capital accumulation and land banking, feeding the myth of a “profitable metro.”

However, after 2020, the cooling land market and tightened real estate regulations drastically altered the landscape. Shenzhen's urban core faced a shortage of developable land, stripping the model of its most crucial cash flow source. Projects already in progress or anticipated to generate returns were delayed or halted, placing Shenzhen Metro in a double bind: construction costs continued to climb while real estate monetization became increasingly difficult.

By 2024, the company reportedly held nearly 70 real estate projects, but many remain stuck in early-stage approval or financial difficulty. As debt pressure mounts, the company can no longer rely on property development to bridge funding gaps, leading to rapid deterioration in its balance sheet.

3. Operational Strain and Mounting Debt: Core Business Under Siege

Even in its core transit operations, Shenzhen Metro faces growing challenges. By 2024, its total operating mileage exceeded 500 kilometers, with annual maintenance and operational costs in the tens of billions of yuan. Ticket revenue, however, is far from sufficient to cover these expenses.

In fact, most metro systems in China operate at a loss, as ticket sales alone cannot offset high operating and depreciation costs. Shenzhen once enjoyed population-driven ticketing and advertising revenues, but with slowing passenger growth and a shrinking advertising market, those revenue streams have dried up. The COVID-19 pandemic further battered ridership and earnings, pushing the metro’s core business into persistent deficits.

Meanwhile, its past expansion spree has left a ballooning debt problem. According to its annual report, Shenzhen Metro's total liabilities have surpassed 410 billion yuan. Although some of this comes from policy-backed loans and municipal bonds, the mounting interest and liquidity risks are inflicting lasting damage on its financial health.

4. The Dilemma of a State-Private “Marriage”

Many observers see Shenzhen Metro’s entanglement with Vanke as a primary reason for its financial woes. The original rationale for acquiring Vanke shares was to “safeguard urban strategic assets,” but in reality, it saddled Shenzhen Metro with all the risks of China’s cyclical real estate sector.

As the property market deleverages and cools, Vanke’s stock continues to fall, with recurring liquidity concerns and even rumors of potential default. As Vanke’s largest shareholder, Shenzhen Metro has not only suffered massive investment losses but has also been forced to repeatedly inject capital, earning it the reputation of a reluctant “bag-holder.” This has sparked public debate about whether state-owned enterprises should participate in market-oriented, high-risk investments at all.

This dramatic transformation of Shenzhen Metro from model enterprise to financial cautionary tale underscores the importance of strategic focus, prudent risk management, and the limitations of cross-sector expansion—especially when public resources are involved. As the company navigates this crisis, it may well become a case study in how quickly a seemingly invincible state asset can become entangled in the broader volatility of China’s real estate and financial markets.