近年來，中國高鐵這個國家級標誌性工程雖在全球範圍內技術領先、里程驚人，卻同時陷入嚴重的財務困境。2023年前九個月，中國國家鐵路集團的財報顯示，累計虧損高達947億元，等於每天虧損約3.5億元人民幣。而總負債更突破六兆元，幾乎佔中國GDP的5%。即便是人們熟悉的熱門線路，如京滬高鐵，其客運收入也僅能覆蓋約七成營運成本，其餘需依賴政府補貼。與日本新幹線與法國TGV的盈虧平衡或盈利模式相比，中國高鐵的財政壓力愈加明顯，2023年的虧損額更較2022年上升12%。這不禁令人疑惑：擁有14億人口的中國，為何撐不起高鐵？問題可從多方面解析。

首先是「超前建設」導致的大躍進式擴張。至2023年止，中國高鐵營運里程已達4.37萬公里，佔全球總長度的三分之二，然而中西部多數路段卻出現「運椅子」現象，例如鄭渝高鐵上座率不足四成，貴廣高鐵日均客流僅達設計容量的三分之一。此外，西部山區的建設成本極高，每公里造價動輒達1.5至2億元，回本難度巨大。

其次是票價體系僵化所致。以北京至上海的二等座為例，自2011年開通以來票價維持在553元，至今未曾上調。對比之下，距離相仿的東京至大阪新幹線票價約為1400元人民幣。儘管2023年京滬高鐵試行浮動票價，但遭遇極大輿論壓力，票價調整成為政策與民意之間的拉鋸戰。

高企的債務利息亦是沉重負擔。六兆元債務每年光是利息支出就高達2000億元，而2023年全年的客運總收入僅有4200億元。更雪上加霜的是，為持續新建高鐵線路，每年仍需新增舉債三千至四千億元，債務雪球滾得越來越大。再來是營運成本居高不下。以「復興號」為例，時速250公里每小時耗電可達4800度，電費可觀；人力方面，全國鐵路系統編制人員約達200萬人，遠高於日本JR系統的16萬人；而維修開支亦非小數目，高鐵軌道每三年需進行大修，每公里花費逾百萬元。

疫情過後的復甦乏力，更讓高鐵經營雪上加霜。雖然2023年全國客運量已恢復至2019年的九成，但商務出行卻下降約三成，800公里以上路線更逐步被航班搶去客源，導致高鐵票價優勢不再。當外界開始關注六兆債務是否會引發系統性風險時，可以從其結構中看到端倪。政策性銀行貸款佔比達35%，其次為建設債券（30%）與商業銀行貸款（25%），剩下的為其他債務。風險主要體現在三方面：首先，地方政府財政與高鐵項目高度綁定，七成高鐵建設需地方政府資金配套，導致多地財政吃緊；其次，政策性金融機構如國開行對鐵路的貸款已佔其資產總額的15%，一旦違約波及面廣；最後，部分新建高鐵線的投資回收期已從原先預估的15年延長至超過30年，甚至無望回本，造成資源錯配。

在困局之中，國際經驗或可提供借鏡。例如日本模式強調運營拆分與地區化經營，JR東日本甚至上市融資；法國則實行幹線高鐵與支線普通鐵路混合運營；德國則以貨運補貼客運，而中國高鐵貨運佔比目前仍不到5%。中國也開始嘗試改革。一方面推行票價市場化，例如京滬高鐵試行高峰與淡季差異定價；另一方面引入社會資本，部分高鐵股權已向民間出讓。對於長期虧損的線路，亦開始逐步叫停，例如2023年叫停部分中西部新建高鐵計劃；同時也在探索多元營運方式，如高鐵快遞、旅遊專列等創新業態。

未來高鐵是否還要繼續擴建？答案不是單純的「是」或「否」。根據「十四五」規劃，未來五年新增高鐵總里程已從原本的1.2萬公里下修至8000公里，並逐步轉向城市群間的通勤鐵路（如粵港澳大灣區），對現有線路進行提速改造，或建設中老鐵路等國際通道。從經濟帳上來看，中西部高鐵投資回報期漫長，甚至「百年難回本」，但其帶動區域經濟平衡發展的間接效益，仍具戰略價值。例如成渝雙城經濟圈的崛起，就是交通先行的成果之一。此外，高鐵在特殊情況下具備戰時替代航空的潛力，也可作為技術輸出產品，成功助印尼、泰國等國發展當地高鐵。

總結而言，中國高鐵正處於從「規模至上」邁向「質量效益」的轉型陣痛期。短期內六萬億債務無疑是沉重負擔，但長遠來看，高鐵作為國家戰略基礎設施，其價值不應僅以財務盈虧來衡量。如何在經濟效益與社會效益之間取得平衡，避免陷入「越建越虧、越虧越建」的惡性循環，將成為未來十年中國高鐵改革的關鍵命題。

China’s High-Speed Rail Dilemma: A Daily Loss of 300 Million and Six Trillion in Debt — Is It Becoming an Economic Black Hole?

In recent years, China’s high-speed rail (HSR) system — once hailed as a national symbol of technological and infrastructural prowess — has fallen into deep financial trouble. According to the financial report of China State Railway Group for the first nine months of 2023, cumulative losses reached 94.7 billion yuan, averaging a daily deficit of 350 million yuan. Meanwhile, total debt has soared past six trillion yuan, equating to nearly 5% of China’s GDP. Even on well-known lines such as the Beijing–Shanghai HSR, passenger revenue covers only about 70% of operating costs, with the rest reliant on government subsidies. Compared with Japan’s profitable Shinkansen and France’s break-even TGV, China’s railway finances are under growing strain. The loss in 2023 alone rose by 12% over the previous year.

This raises an urgent question: Why can’t a country of 1.4 billion people support its own HSR network? The reasons are multifaceted.

One key factor is the aggressive and premature expansion — a “Great Leap Forward” in railway construction. As of 2023, China’s HSR network spans 43,700 kilometers, accounting for two-thirds of the global total. However, many lines in central and western regions run nearly empty. For instance, the Zhengzhou–Chongqing HSR has a seat occupancy rate below 40%, while the Guiyang–Guangzhou line carries only a third of its designed daily passenger capacity. Construction costs in mountainous western areas are also staggering, reaching 150 to 200 million yuan per kilometer, making it nearly impossible to recoup investment.

Another issue lies in the rigid pricing system. Take the Beijing–Shanghai line: the second-class ticket has remained fixed at 553 yuan since it opened in 2011. In contrast, a similar-distance trip from Tokyo to Osaka on the Shinkansen costs the equivalent of about 1,400 yuan. While dynamic pricing was piloted on the Beijing–Shanghai route in 2023, it met with fierce public backlash, turning fare adjustments into a political tug-of-war.

The heavy burden of debt interest is also a major concern. Interest payments on the six trillion yuan debt alone amount to about 200 billion yuan per year, while total passenger transport revenue in 2023 was only 420 billion yuan. Making matters worse, new HSR lines still require 300 to 400 billion yuan in new borrowing annually, causing the debt snowball to grow ever larger.

Operating costs remain high as well. For example, a Fuxing-class train running at 250 km/h consumes around 4,800 kWh of electricity per hour — a significant energy cost. China’s railway system employs around 2 million workers, far more than Japan’s JR Group with 160,000. Maintenance expenses are also substantial: HSR tracks require major repairs every three years, costing over 1 million yuan per kilometer each time.

Post-pandemic recovery has been sluggish. While total national passenger volume in 2023 recovered to 90% of pre-COVID levels (2019), business travel declined by around 30%. On routes over 800 km, air travel has steadily siphoned off passengers, eroding HSR’s former price advantage.

As concerns grow over whether six trillion yuan in debt could trigger systemic risk, the structure of this debt reveals further issues. Policy bank loans account for 35% of the total, followed by construction bonds (30%), commercial bank loans (25%), and other forms of debt (10%). The risks manifest in three main areas. First, since 70% of HSR projects require funding from local governments, many provinces have seen their fiscal health deteriorate. Second, policy lenders such as the China Development Bank have railway loans accounting for 15% of their total assets — a large exposure. Third, the return period for new HSR lines has stretched from the expected 15 years to more than 30, with some lines unlikely to ever break even, leading to severe resource misallocation.

In the midst of this dilemma, international models offer possible solutions. Japan has adopted a decentralized, regionalized structure, with JR East even publicly listed. France combines high-speed trunk lines with conventional feeder rail. Germany cross-subsidizes passenger transport with freight services — whereas in China, freight only accounts for less than 5% of HSR operations.

China has already begun experimenting with reform. On one hand, it is promoting market-based ticket pricing, such as peak and off-peak fares on the Beijing–Shanghai line. On the other, it is introducing private capital — portions of equity in HSR lines like Shanghai–Nanjing have already been sold to non-state investors. Meanwhile, persistently unprofitable routes, especially in central and western China, are being scaled back or canceled — as was the case with several projects halted in 2023. New service models such as HSR express delivery and tourist trains are also being explored.

So, should HSR expansion continue? The answer is not a simple yes or no. According to the 14th Five-Year Plan, China has reduced its target for new HSR mileage over the next five years from 12,000 km to 8,000 km. The focus is shifting toward urban cluster commuter rail (e.g., in the Greater Bay Area), upgrading existing lines for higher speeds, and building international routes such as the extension of the China–Laos Railway.

From an economic perspective, it’s clear that many HSR investments in China’s interior may never break even, not even in a century. But the indirect benefits — such as promoting balanced regional development, as seen in the Chengdu–Chongqing urban cluster — carry long-term strategic value. In times of national emergency, HSR could also serve as a backup for air transport. Moreover, China’s HSR expertise has become a valuable export, helping countries like Indonesia and Thailand build their own systems.

In summary, China’s HSR is transitioning from a phase of rapid scale expansion to one focused on quality and efficiency — a painful but necessary transformation. In the short term, six trillion yuan in debt is undeniably a heavy burden. But over the long term, HSR’s value as a pillar of national infrastructure should not be judged solely on financial returns. The true challenge lies in striking a balance between economic and social returns, and in avoiding the vicious cycle of “the more you build, the more you lose.” The next decade may well be a decisive window for comprehensive high-speed rail reform in China.