當前中國地方政府的土地出讓收入正面臨前所未有的下滑。根據2024年官方數據，全國土地出讓金收入降至4.87兆元人民幣，相比2021年巔峰的8.5兆元，已驟減超過四成，創近年新低。這一現象背後，反映的不僅是房地產市場的全面降溫，更揭示土地財政模式正在進入深層調整期。

一、從歷史高點到持續下滑：數據折射市場寒意:自2010年代以來，土地出讓金曾是地方政府最重要的財政來源，尤其在2013年、2017年等年份，曾出現兩位數增長高峰。但自2021年起，這一數據持續回落。2022年降至6.69兆元、2023年再降至5.66兆元，而2024年最新的4.87兆元更是創下2015年以來新低。

這不僅是收入規模下降，同比變動率也轉為明顯負增長。2024年同比降幅超過14%，顯示土地市場無論在「成交量」還是「成交價」上，都呈現全面疲弱態勢。

二、房市轉冷與政策收緊：購地需求的斷崖式下降: 造成土地收入驟減的首要原因，是房地產市場的深度調整。多年來依靠高槓桿、高周轉擴張的房企，受到政策壓力（如「三條紅線」與限貸限融政策）與市場冷卻的雙重打擊，資金鏈斷裂、項目去化困難，使它們無力再大手筆拿地。尤其在三四線城市，大量土地頻繁流拍，部分地區的流拍率甚至超過20%。此外，「房住不炒」政策確立以來，中央對住宅用地供應嚴加控管，推行「以房定地」，限制地方無序供地與舊模式的土地財政衝刺。這使得住宅用地供應總量明顯下降，即便市場稍有回暖，供應端也無法支撐收入規模反彈。

三、供地結構轉向公益屬性：保障性住房影響出讓金水平: 2023年至2024年間，中國多地加快「保障性住房」與「保障性租賃住房」的土地供應。這類用地多數由政府平台或政策性機構以低價甚至零地價方式獲得，導致實際成交金額難以與商品房時期相比。這種結構性轉變，對土地出讓金的整體拉動作用減弱。

四、地方「城投公司」托底拿地：收入數字失真，風險上升: 為穩定市場與地價，許多地方政府動用城投平台「自買自賣」土地，假裝市場活躍。表面上成交成功，實則是政府左手倒右手，最終成交價低、真金白銀未入帳。這種「虛假成交」手段在短期內穩定統計數字，但實際掏空地方資金，並推高地方債務風險。這也使得不少專家指出，當前土地出讓金的表面數字，其實高估市場真實熱度。

五、區域分化加劇：一線尚可支撐，低能級城市重災區: 2024年數據顯示，一線城市（如北京、上海）仍維持部分土地出讓活躍度，尤其是核心地段的商辦用地，仍有企業出手。但這難以抵消二三四線城市的全面萎縮。部分中小城市土地出讓收入跌幅高達七成以上，形成明顯的區域斷層。這也進一步擴大地方財政不平衡，令財政自給能力原本就不足的中西部與三四線地區陷入困境。

六、土地財政模式面臨制度性轉折: 長期以來，中國地方財政高度依賴「賣地收入」來彌補財政缺口，支持基礎建設與公共開支。但當土地市場失靈、房企收縮、需求塌陷，這種財政模式顯然已難以為繼。許多地方財政壓力加劇，開始頻繁「盤活存量資產」、推行資產證券化或寄望中央轉移支付彌補財政缺口。

總結：土地出讓金收入的大幅下滑，是中國房地產與財政體系深度調整的直接結果。它不僅揭示出土地財政的不可持續性，也暴露出地方經濟對房地產的依賴問題。隨著房市持續收縮，未來的財政重建勢必需要：

 • 推動稅收制度改革，減少對賣地的依賴；

 • 加強土地利用效率，促進存量更新而非增量擴張；

 • 完善住房保障體系，使土地與城市發展更具韌性。

這場土地財政的「退潮」，正推動地方政府走向新的經濟與財政治理模式，一個以高質量發展為導向的轉型期已然開啟。

China’s local governments are currently facing an unprecedented decline in land sales revenue. According to official data from 2024, national land transfer income has fallen to 4.87 trillion yuan, a sharp drop of over 40% from its 2021 peak of 8.5 trillion yuan—marking the lowest level in recent years. This dramatic decline reflects not only a widespread cooling of the real estate market but also signals that China’s long-standing “land finance” model is undergoing a fundamental structural adjustment.

From Record Highs to Steady Decline: Numbers Reveal Market Chill

Since the 2010s, land transfer fees have been one of the most crucial sources of local government revenue. In certain years like 2013 and 2017, revenue growth hit double digits. However, starting in 2021, a persistent downward trend has emerged: income fell to 6.69 trillion yuan in 2022, dropped further to 5.66 trillion in 2023, and now, in 2024, has reached a new low of 4.87 trillion yuan.

This is not just about shrinking revenue; the year-on-year growth rate has also turned deeply negative. In 2024, land sales revenue declined more than 14% compared to the previous year, indicating widespread weakness in both transaction volume and land prices across the country.

Cooling Housing Market and Policy Tightening: A Collapse in Land Demand

The primary reason for the plummeting land income is the deep structural adjustment in the property market. Developers who had long relied on high leverage and rapid turnover have been hit hard by both stringent policy constraints—such as the “three red lines” and lending restrictions—and the market slowdown. With broken capital chains and sluggish home sales, many developers are no longer able to acquire land on a large scale.

In lower-tier cities, land auctions have frequently failed, with some regions reporting a land auction failure rate exceeding 20%. Additionally, under the “housing is for living in, not for speculation” policy, the central government has strictly controlled residential land supply, promoting a “demand-based supply” model that restricts excessive land sales. This has significantly reduced total land availability, making it hard for revenues to rebound even if the market shows minor improvements.

A Shift Toward Public Use Land: Affordable Housing Weakens Land Sale Value

Between 2023 and 2024, many cities began prioritizing land allocation for affordable housing and government-supported rental housing. These plots are typically transferred to state-owned platforms or public housing developers at low or even zero cost, meaning the transaction values are far lower than during the commodity housing boom. This structural shift weakens the overall contribution of such land to transfer income.

“Local Government Buying Its Own Land”: Falsified Revenue and Rising Risks

To stabilize the market and floor prices, many local governments have used local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) to purchase land, creating an illusion of active market demand. In reality, these are often internal transfers with low transaction prices and no real cash flow. While this practice helps stabilize statistics in the short term, it drains local finances and significantly raises debt risks. Many experts now warn that current land transfer revenue figures overstate actual market vitality.

Widening Regional Disparities: First-Tier Cities Hold On, Smaller Cities Collapse

In 2024, first-tier cities like Beijing and Shanghai have maintained some level of land sales activity, especially for prime office and commercial sites. However, this strength cannot offset the widespread decline in lower-tier cities, where land transfer revenue in some cases has fallen by over 70%. The result is a deepening regional divide, worsening fiscal imbalances, and pushing third- and fourth-tier or inland cities—already fiscally weak—into financial distress.

Systemic Turning Point: The Land Finance Model Reaches Its Limit

For decades, China’s local governments have relied heavily on land sales to fill budget gaps, fund infrastructure, and maintain public services. But with the property market contracting, developer demand collapsing, and land prices stagnating, this model is no longer sustainable. Many local governments are now under intensifying fiscal pressure, resorting to monetizing existing assets, pushing for asset securitization, or relying on central government transfer payments to stay afloat.

Conclusion:The sharp decline in land transfer revenue is a direct reflection of the profound transformation underway in both China’s property and fiscal systems. It not only underscores the unsustainability of the land finance model but also exposes how deeply local economies depend on real estate. As the housing market continues to shrink, a new phase of fiscal rebuilding is emerging, which will require:

 • Reforming the tax system to reduce dependency on land sales

 • Improving land-use efficiency by focusing on redevelopment rather than expansion

 • Strengthening the public housing system to enhance urban resilience

This retreat from land finance is forcing local governments to explore new models of economic and fiscal governance. A transition toward high-quality, sustainable development has already begun.