近日，數架具有中資背景的租賃飛機在俄羅斯遭到扣留，引發外界關注與議論。然而，中方官方對此並未高調發聲，背後其實有多重原因。表面上看，中國在俄烏衝突中一直保持中立，既沒有參與制裁俄羅斯，也沒有扣押任何俄方資產，那麼為什麼會出現俄方扣押中資飛機的情況？

首先，這與俄羅斯的“無差別”扣押政策有關。自西方國家對俄實施全面航空制裁後，幾乎所有國際租賃公司都試圖收回租給俄方的飛機。然而，俄羅斯為確保國內航運正常運行，直接採取全面留置的方式，不論飛機的實際控制權或背景，只要屬於外國租賃資產，便一律扣下。這並非針對中國，而是整體策略的一部分。

其次，俄羅斯自身的民航機隊規模與性能遠不如西方製造商的產品。俄國目前的伊爾-96大型客機數量僅有三十餘架，其中真正用於民航的僅約二十架。而被寄予厚望、研發多年的 MC-21 客機，直到近期才完成首飛，距離大規模服役仍需時日。在此情況下，俄方極度依賴現有的租賃機隊，尤其是波音、空客等國際品牌飛機，自然不願輕易歸還。

更麻煩的是，西方禁令還導致俄羅斯境內的外國製造飛機失去原籍國適航認證，這意味著即使這些飛機留在俄國，也無法合法進入國際航線。在認證恢復之前，它們幾乎只能在俄羅斯國內使用，而俄方對於暫時無法國際飛行的飛機，也就更沒有歸還的動力。

第三，這批被扣留的所謂“中資背景”飛機，很多並非直接掛中國國籍。許多中資租賃公司雖然母公司在中國，但實際註冊地設在愛爾蘭、英屬維爾京群島、新加坡等國際避稅地，主要是為了融資便利與節省稅費。而在法律與合同層面，這些飛機的所有權與司法管轄權往往與西方法律體系掛鉤，因此俄方在扣押時是依據註冊地與合同條款來行事，而不是依據實際控制方的國籍。

事實上，只有那些中資租賃公司在股權或資金上與歐美有直接關聯的飛機才被扣押，而完全由中方全資持有、並在非西方法律管轄區註冊的飛機，幾乎沒有遭遇此類情況。換句話說，俄方在執行扣押時並不會特別區分“中國企業”與否，而是看法律與合同屬於哪個司法體系。

這也是為什麼中方官方沒有大張旗鼓發聲的原因——一方面，這並非俄方針對中國的行為，而是更廣泛的航空資產爭議；另一方面，許多被扣押飛機在法律與國籍層面並不屬於中國，公開施壓的法律基礎並不充分。至於外界想藉此挑撥中俄關係的企圖，已經持續多年，但實際效果有限。

Recently, several leased aircraft with Chinese investment backgrounds were seized in Russia, drawing public attention and sparking discussion. However, Chinese authorities have remained relatively quiet on the matter, and there are multiple reasons behind this. On the surface, China has maintained a neutral stance in the Russia–Ukraine conflict, neither participating in sanctions against Russia nor seizing any Russian assets. So why would Russia detain aircraft linked to Chinese investors?

First, this is tied to Russia’s “indiscriminate” seizure policy. Since Western countries imposed comprehensive aviation sanctions on Russia, nearly all international leasing companies have tried to repossess aircraft leased to Russian operators. However, to ensure domestic air transport continues, Russia adopted a sweeping retention approach—any foreign-leased aircraft, regardless of who actually controls it or its background, would be seized. This is not aimed specifically at China, but rather part of a broader strategy.

Second, Russia’s own civil aviation fleet is far smaller and less advanced than Western manufacturers’ products. At present, Russia has only around 30 Ilyushin Il-96 large passenger aircraft, with about 20 actually in civil service. The MC-21 airliner, which Russia has been developing for years and heavily promoting, only recently completed its first flight and is still years away from mass deployment. In this situation, Russia is heavily dependent on its existing leased fleet—especially Boeing and Airbus aircraft from international markets—and is naturally unwilling to return them.

Complicating matters further, Western sanctions have stripped foreign-manufactured aircraft in Russia of their airworthiness certifications from their countries of origin. This means that even if these planes remain in Russia, they cannot legally operate on international routes. Until certification is restored, they can only be used domestically, giving Russia even less incentive to return them.

Third, many of the so-called “Chinese-invested” aircraft being held are not registered under the Chinese flag. Many Chinese leasing companies, though owned by Chinese parent firms, are actually registered in jurisdictions such as Ireland, the British Virgin Islands, or Singapore—primarily for financing convenience and tax savings. Legally and contractually, ownership and jurisdiction for these planes are often tied to Western legal systems. Therefore, when Russia seizes them, it acts based on the place of registration and contractual terms, not the nationality of the controlling shareholders.

In fact, only those aircraft linked to Chinese lessors that have direct equity or funding ties to Europe or the United States are subject to seizure. Aircraft wholly owned by Chinese entities and registered outside Western legal jurisdictions have rarely faced such issues. In other words, Russia does not distinguish “Chinese companies” from others when seizing aircraft—it looks at which legal framework and contracts they fall under.

This also explains why Chinese authorities have not made strong public statements. On one hand, these seizures are not targeted actions against China, but part of a broader dispute over aviation assets. On the other hand, many of the detained aircraft are, in legal and nationality terms, not considered Chinese, leaving little legal basis for China to apply public diplomatic pressure. As for external attempts to use this incident to sow discord in China–Russia relations, such efforts have been ongoing for years but have had limited real effect.