均和集團，一度被譽為「長三角百強」、「中國企業500強」的明星企業，短短數月之間，竟然從榮耀之巔跌入泥淖，留下的是五千多名員工失業、供應商血本無歸、全國多個房地產與園區項目爛尾的慘局。

故事的核心人物是何旗，這位1982年出生於福建長樂的年輕富豪，17歲就接手家族生意，之後憑藉大膽的擴張手法與靈活的資本運作，在短短二十年間將均和集團推向千億級規模的高度。2003年，他在上海成立上海均和金屬材料有限公司，以鋼鐵貿易起家，並迅速將業務推向國際市場。2008年，他回到福建，成立廈門均和，擴張腳步進一步加快。真正讓何旗的財富迎來「裂變」的，是2015年他大舉進軍金融資本市場，參股銀行、證券公司，設立基金與保理公司，形成「大宗貿易 + 金融投資」的雙引擎模式。2018年，均和集團雙雙入選中國民營企業500強，何旗的個人財富突破80億元，榮登胡潤百富榜，並成為福建長樂的首富。

然而，這份繁榮的背後，其實建立在數據造假與資本空轉之上。均和的「千億規模」主要靠大宗貿易中的「刷單」堆疊數字，營造出龐大的交易額，進而獲得官方認可的「500強」名號。有這層光環，均和能迅速與地方政府建立合作關係，成為招商引資的座上賓，輕鬆獲取土地與項目，進而進行融資。之後再透過形象工程與「園區建設」包裝，進一步擴張資金盤，形成資金借新還舊、循環套現的資本遊戲。

2020年後，何旗將目光投向文化旅遊地產與產業園區，推出「均和雲谷」品牌，試圖複製「華夏幸福」模式，把產業園當成資金出口與地方政府合作的新藉口。但這個看似「有形資產」的投資，本質上依然是土地套利與預售融資，一旦市場下行或資金鏈斷裂，所有項目立刻陷入停擺。2025年6月，這艘龐大的商業巨輪終於熄火。公司以「資金困難」為由，要求員工自行辭職，只願意支付5月底的工資與社保，拒絕支付任何賠償。不願配合的員工甚至連5月工資都拿不到。數千名員工因此湧入仲裁與維權現場，場面極為混亂。

與此同時，全國多地的項目全面爆雷。青島城陽區的「均和雲谷」廠房項目被查封，眾多投資的小企業主欲哭無淚；福州長樂的地產項目延期交付，接近爛尾。供應商、承包商的貨款也一夜蒸發，債務鏈條全面斷裂。最具戲劇性的是，均和的創辦人何旗早已失聯多年，據傳旅居日本，徹底「人間蒸發」。

均和的暴雷，不僅是一起單純的企業失敗事件，更像是中國某些民營企業運行邏輯的縮影。表面上以「500強」頭銜與巨額營收粉飾太平，實際上卻靠資本遊戲與政企合謀運作，透過資金空轉與政策紅利構築繁華幻影。一旦市場冷卻、融資渠道斷裂，這些看似龐大的商業帝國瞬間土崩瓦解，留下的是投資者、員工與社會的巨大傷痕。

這起事件如今已進入司法程序，上海警方已對均和集團立案偵查，但5000名員工的工資與賠償依舊沒有著落。從「百強光環」到「爆雷廢墟」，均和的故事既是一個關於野心、資本與幻象的故事，也是當代中國民營企業風險的真實寫照。

This news exposes a shocking collapse in China’s corporate world. Junhe Group, once hailed as one of the “Top 100 in the Yangtze River Delta” and ranked among the “China Fortune 500,” suddenly crumbled within just a few months, leaving over 5,000 employees jobless, suppliers unpaid, and multiple real estate and industrial park projects across the country stalled or abandoned.

At the center of this story is He Qi, born in 1982 in Changle, Fujian. At just 17, he inherited the family business and, through bold expansion and aggressive use of financial capital, built Junhe into a conglomerate worth over 100 billion yuan within two decades. In 2003, he founded Shanghai Junhe Metal Materials Co., starting with steel trading, and quickly pushed the business into the international market. By 2008, he had expanded to Xiamen, further accelerating growth. The true turning point came in 2015, when he dove into financial investments—buying stakes in Jiujiang Bank and Shenwan Securities, establishing factoring companies and funds, and even participating in the H-share listing of Jiangxi Bank. His empire was then driven by a dual engine of bulk commodity trading + financial capital.

By 2018, Junhe was at its peak: both the Shanghai and Xiamen arms were listed among China’s Top 500 private companies, while He Qi’s personal wealth skyrocketed to 8 billion yuan. He appeared on the Hurun Rich List and became the richest man in Changle, Fujian.

But behind this glamour was a façade built on inflated numbers and capital cycles. Much of Junhe’s supposed “trillion-yuan scale” came from fake trading volume in bulk commodities, essentially “washing transactions” to create the illusion of massive turnover. This inflated data earned them the “Fortune 500” label, which in turn secured relationships with local governments eager for “star enterprises.” With that legitimacy, Junhe could easily obtain land, projects, and financing. These funds were then funneled into vanity projects and more expansion, creating a cycle of image-building and debt-driven growth.

After 2020, He Qi shifted into cultural tourism real estate and industrial parks under the “Junhe Cloud Valley” brand, mirroring the model of Huaxia Happiness. These projects were marketed as “industrial upgrades” and “regional development,” but in reality, they were land speculation and pre-sale financing schemes. When the market cooled and financing dried up, everything collapsed.

By June 2025, Junhe’s giant commercial vessel finally sank. The company announced it could no longer sustain operations and asked employees to resign voluntarily—those who cooperated would only get May’s wages and social insurance, with no severance pay, while those who resisted wouldn’t even get paid. This sparked mass anger as thousands of workers lined up for labor arbitration.

Meanwhile, projects across the country imploded. In Qingdao’s Chengyang District, small business owners who had bought Junhe Cloud Valley factory units were devastated when the site was sealed off. In Changle, Fuzhou, a real estate project was delayed to near-abandonment. Contractors and suppliers across the country were left with unpaid debts. The most dramatic twist: He Qi himself had already been missing for years—reportedly living in Japan—and has effectively disappeared.

The fall of Junhe is not merely a case of corporate mismanagement but a symptom of a deeper pattern in Chinese private enterprises. Outwardly, they rely on the halo of “Fortune 500” and massive revenues to project strength, but underneath, their operations are often built on capital games, inflated transactions, and collusion with local governments. Once the financing channels shut, these giant empires collapse instantly, leaving devastation for employees, investors, and society.

The case has now entered the judicial stage, with Shanghai police filing an investigation into Junhe. However, the wages and severance of its 5,000 employees remain unresolved. From a “star enterprise” to a “collapsed giant,” the Junhe story is a tale of ambition, illusion, and systemic risk in China’s private economy.