近期俄羅斯的局勢顯得相當複雜而且不妙。雖然在俄烏戰場上，俄軍付出極為沉重的傷亡代價，最終攻下戰略要地紅軍城，這對於烏克蘭頓巴斯地區的防線而言，確實構成沉重打擊，但這一戰果並不能被視為徹底的轉折。距離真正讓烏克蘭戰敗，俄羅斯仍有極長的距離。更直接地說，只要西方持續提供軍事與經濟援助，以俄羅斯現有的國力與消耗速度，要取得最終勝利依舊遙遙無期。

在這種戰場膠著的背景下，俄羅斯的經濟壓力愈發沉重。持續的軍事投入使國家財政逐漸難以為繼，而這種壓力不僅體現在前線，更開始波及到南高加索地區乃至車臣，引發連鎖效應。對俄羅斯而言，如果無法獲得新的外部資源注入，不僅在東歐戰場的戰略利益可能遭受重創，就連南俄與高加索的地緣格局也將受到重大反噬。對於莫斯科來說，這些地區的重要性遠在遠東之上。換言之，東歐的利益受損是當前的迫切風險，而遠東即便出現問題，也多半只是長期的潛在挑戰。孰輕孰重，俄方心中自有盤算。

然而，普丁作為「強人總統」，一貫的策略就是「兩頭都要」。即便國內局勢困難重重，他依然不願鬆口。這種強硬姿態不僅展現在戰爭戰線的死守，也體現在經濟與外交層面的博弈。雖然當前俄羅斯經濟高度依賴中俄貿易，內需市場更是由中國商品支撐，但俄方並未因此完全安心，反而時常流露出防範與戒心。

例如在能源、遠東基礎設施與資源開發上，俄羅斯近期竟與韓國有私下接觸，而韓國此刻仍參與西方對俄制裁。這種「兩面下注」的做法，正反映出莫斯科不願完全綁死在中國一邊的心態。另一方面，在中國商品佔據俄羅斯市場的同時，俄方卻又屢次暗中設下阻礙。最典型的一次發生在今年8月1日，俄羅斯海關系統突然切換新稅率表，使得一輛20噸的中國貨車報廢稅從262萬盧布暴漲至430萬。這樣的小動作無疑帶有試探與警告意味。

這些表面看似矛盾的行徑，其實反映出俄羅斯對中國的複雜心態。當下它與西方陷入生死對抗，卻依然懷抱著某種「與西方和解」的幻想；同時，儘管國運幾乎已與中國合作深度綁定，但克里姆林宮依然戒懼中國的影響力。對俄方而言，依賴是一回事，卻絕不願在心理與地位上淪為中國的附庸。

整體而言，俄羅斯目前正處在兩難之境：戰場未見曙光，經濟卻已捉襟見肘；對外依靠中國，但心態卻是依賴與戒懼並存。這種矛盾，或許正是普京政權未來最難以調和的隱憂。

Russia’s current situation appears highly complicated and unfavorable. On the battlefield in Ukraine, despite suffering extremely heavy casualties, Russian forces finally managed to capture the strategic stronghold of Krasnoarmeysk (Red Army City). This was indeed a significant blow to Ukraine’s Donbas defenses, but it cannot yet be considered a true turning point. The reality is that Russia is still far from forcing Ukraine into defeat. Put bluntly, as long as the West continues to provide military and economic assistance, Russia, with its current strength and rate of attrition, is nowhere near securing ultimate victory.

Against this backdrop of stalemate, Russia’s economic pressure is mounting. The ongoing war effort is increasingly unsustainable for state finances, and this strain is now spilling beyond the frontlines into the South Caucasus and even Chechnya, triggering chain reactions. For Moscow, the stakes are not limited to Ukraine or Belarus; the geostrategic interests of southern Russia and the Caucasus are considered far more vital than those of the distant Far East. In other words, the risk of losing influence in Eastern Europe is an immediate and urgent threat, while the possibility of setbacks in the Far East, if it exists at all, remains a long-term and potential issue. Russia is well aware of the difference.

Yet, as a strongman leader, Vladimir Putin insists on “having it both ways.” Even with mounting domestic difficulties, he refuses to compromise. This hardline stance is visible not only in Russia’s military commitment but also in its economic and diplomatic maneuvers. Although Russia’s economy is now heavily dependent on trade with China, with its domestic market largely sustained by Chinese goods, Moscow has not grown comfortable with this reliance. Instead, it often shows signs of suspicion and caution.

For instance, in the fields of energy, infrastructure, and resource development in the Russian Far East, Moscow has recently engaged in quiet contacts with South Korea—a country currently participating in Western sanctions against Russia. This sort of “double betting” reflects Russia’s reluctance to bind itself entirely to China. At the same time, while Chinese products dominate the Russian market, the Russian government has repeatedly set obstacles behind the scenes. A striking example occurred on August 1, when Russia’s customs system abruptly switched to a new tariff schedule, raising the scrapping tax for a 20-ton Chinese truck from 2.62 million rubles to 4.3 million. Moves like this carry both a probing and a warning signal.

Such seemingly contradictory actions reveal Russia’s complicated attitude toward China. Even while locked in a life-or-death struggle with the West, Moscow still clings to the hope of some form of reconciliation. Meanwhile, though Russia’s fate is now deeply tied to cooperation with China, the Kremlin remains wary of China’s influence. For Russia, reliance is unavoidable, but it is determined not to be reduced to China’s vassal in either status or perception.

Overall, Russia is caught in a dilemma: no breakthrough on the battlefield, yet its economy is already stretched thin; dependent on China, yet simultaneously cautious and distrustful. This paradox may well prove to be the Kremlin’s most difficult challenge to reconcile in the future.