這次日本政府對「經營管理簽證」的改革，可以說是自2006年制度設立以來最大幅度的收緊措施。過去將近二十年，這張簽證之所以受到外國投資者，特別是華人群體的追捧，正是因為條件寬鬆、手續快速且成功率高。只要準備500萬日元的資本金，加上一份基本可行的商業計畫書，就能輕鬆獲得簽證。對比其他發達國家甚至是亞洲鄰國的要求，這個門檻顯然低得驚人。也因此，經營管理簽證在過去幾年被許多人視為「移民捷徑」，持有人數迅速上升，從2019年的不到3萬人，一路增至2024年的4.1萬人，其中中國人佔超過一半。

然而，制度的初衷本是吸引真正願意落地經營、帶來就業與經濟活力的企業家。實際情況卻偏離原本設計——大量「空殼公司」出現，只在帳面上維持營運，實際上沒有任何實質業務。有些人甚至拿到經管簽證後直接去打工，完全背離政策目的。這些亂象不僅造成入管局的管理負擔，也在日本社會引起輿論反彈。媒體屢次報導「假經營、真移民」的情況，社會的不滿情緒逐漸累積，日本政府最終決定出手整頓。

新的規範可以用幾個關鍵字來概括：大幅提高資本金門檻，嚴格的資格審查，以及專業人士把關。首先，申請者的註冊資本金從原本的500萬日元直接躍升至3000萬日元，等於從100萬台幣提升到600萬台幣，幾乎是六倍的增加。這不僅是財務上的篩選，更是要確保只有真正有實力、有誠意的投資者會考慮申請。其次，申請人必須至少雇用一名全職員工，避免公司淪為空殼。再來，經營者本身需具備三年以上相關領域的經驗，或持有碩士以上的學歷，來證明其經營能力。此外，商業計畫書不再是申請人隨意撰寫便能過關，而必須經由中小企業診斷師等專業人士審查，增加計畫的真實性與可行性。

這一連串改革，無疑將大幅縮減「投機者」的生存空間。對於過去打算用低資本「掛名移民」的人來說，幾乎等同於徹底關門。但若是資金實力雄厚、真心打算在日本深耕的企業家，則可能反而受惠。因為高門檻將自然淘汰掉大量不合格申請者，讓真正的投資者更容易通過審查，簽證審批速度也有望加快。

此外，日本還提供「高級經營管理簽證」的途徑，適合學歷與收入條件突出的申請人。透過積分制來評估，若達到70分，只需居住3年即可申請永住；若達到80分，僅需1年便可獲得永住資格。這樣的設計，對那些符合高標準的人才與企業家來說，更是一個吸引力十足的誘因。

整體來看，這次制度改革象徵日本對外資與人才政策的一次重大轉向。從「廣撒網」轉為「精準選」，既是對過去亂象的回應，也是日本在少子化、經濟轉型壓力下，重新思考如何引入真正能帶來長遠價值的外國企業家。對某些人來說，門檻變高意味著夢想破碎；但對另一些人而言，這或許正是日本營商環境「去偽存真」的開始。

This reform of Japan’s “Business Manager Visa” can be described as the most significant tightening of the system since its establishment in 2006. For nearly two decades, this visa had been highly favored by foreign investors, particularly within the Chinese community, precisely because of its lenient conditions, fast procedures, and high approval rates. Applicants only needed to prepare 5 million yen in capital along with a reasonably viable business plan, and they could easily obtain the visa. Compared to requirements in other developed nations—or even neighboring Asian countries—this threshold was astonishingly low. As a result, in recent years the Business Manager Visa came to be regarded by many as a “shortcut to immigration,” with the number of holders rising rapidly from under 30,000 in 2019 to 41,000 in 2024, more than half of whom were Chinese nationals.

However, the original intention of the system was to attract genuine entrepreneurs who would establish businesses, create jobs, and invigorate the economy. In reality, the outcome deviated from this design. A large number of “shell companies” emerged, maintaining only the appearance of operations without conducting any substantive business. Some people even used the visa as a means to take on regular jobs, entirely betraying the policy’s purpose. These issues not only burdened the Immigration Services Agency with additional oversight, but also provoked backlash within Japanese society. Media reports repeatedly highlighted the phenomenon of “fake businesses, real immigration,” and public dissatisfaction steadily mounted until the government finally decided to tighten controls.

The new regulations can be summed up in three main points: a substantial increase in the capital requirement, stricter applicant qualifications, and mandatory professional oversight. First, the minimum registered capital has been raised from 5 million yen to 30 million yen—equivalent to an increase from around 1 million to 6 million New Taiwan dollars—nearly sixfold. This serves not only as a financial filter but also as a way to ensure that only serious, capable investors will consider applying. Second, applicants are now required to employ at least one full-time staff member, preventing companies from existing only on paper. Third, business managers must have either more than three years of relevant managerial experience or hold a graduate degree to prove their competence. Furthermore, business plans are no longer casually written documents that can pass unchecked; they must now be reviewed by certified professionals such as small and medium enterprise consultants to guarantee authenticity and feasibility.

These reforms will undoubtedly shrink the room for “speculators.” For those who previously sought to use small sums of capital for “nominal immigration,” the new measures amount to a complete closure of that path. Yet for well-capitalized entrepreneurs who genuinely intend to establish themselves in Japan, the changes could prove beneficial. Higher thresholds will naturally weed out unqualified applicants, making it easier for serious investors to gain approval, and visa processing times may also be shortened as a result.

In addition, Japan provides an alternative through the “Highly Skilled Business Manager Visa,” aimed at applicants with outstanding educational or income qualifications. Using a point-based evaluation system, those who score 70 points can apply for permanent residency after just three years of residence, while those with 80 points need only one year. This design serves as an attractive incentive for top-tier talent and entrepreneurs.

Overall, this reform marks a major policy shift in Japan’s approach toward foreign investment and talent. It represents a move from “broad recruitment” to “selective admission,” serving both as a corrective measure to past abuses and as part of Japan’s broader response to demographic decline and economic transformation. For some, the higher bar will mean shattered dreams; but for others, this could be the beginning of a more genuine, transparent, and sustainable business environment in Japan.