近天，日本政壇出現一項歷史性的轉折——64歲的高市早苗（Takaichi Sanae）成功當選自民黨總裁，這意味著她極有可能在不久的將來成為日本史上首位女性首相。這一結果不僅改變日本國內政治格局，也勢必對中日關係以及台海局勢帶來深遠影響。

高市早苗出生於日本奈良縣，母親是警察，父親則從事汽車產業。她畢業於神戶大學經營學系，大學期間便展現出政治熱情，後來曾赴美國擔任國會研究員（Congressional Fellow），在此期間學習到美式民主制度的運作方式，也培養出她對安全戰略與國際政治的敏銳洞察。

回國後，高市進入政界，憑藉堅定的右派立場與強烈的民族主義色彩，在自民黨內崛起。她長期以來被視為安倍晉三路線的繼承者之一，主張「強化日本國防、修改和平憲法、對中國採取更強硬態度」。她多次公開參拜靖國神社，並主張日本應「正面面對歷史」，這種言論在國內保守派支持者中引起共鳴，但同時也引發中國與韓國的強烈不滿。

在對外政策上，高市以「安全第一」為核心理念，強調日本必須在區域安全上扮演更積極的角色。她認為現行憲法第九條過於限制日本的防衛權，曾明確表示支持修改憲法，讓日本自衛隊能在必要時「主動防衛」。

更引人關注的是她今年提出的構想——與台灣建立「準安全聯盟」。這個構想的核心是加強日台在資訊安全、海上防衛與半導體供應鏈方面的合作，並在有需要時提供「戰略支援」。這一提議在日本保守派與美國部分戰略圈中受到肯定，視其為「牽制中國」的重要棋子。然而，北京方面則將此視為挑釁，認為這是日本「干涉中國內政」的行為。

未來，日本與中國、台灣的三角關係勢必更加複雜。若高市早苗正式成為首相，她的政策方向可能出現以下幾個趨勢：

首先，在中日關係上，緊張恐將升級。高市早苗過去曾指責中國在東海、南海的軍事活動「威脅地區穩定」，未來她極可能繼續強化與美國的軍事合作，推動日美安保體系現代化，並支持南西諸島（沖繩、宮古群島等）的軍事部署。這將使中國感受到更強的戰略壓力，中日之間的外交摩擦與軍事對峙或將加劇。

其次，對台灣而言，高市的上任可能帶來更多實質支持。她不僅是日本政壇中少數明確表態「台灣有事即日本有事」的政治人物，也主張日方應在國際舞台上為台灣爭取更多空間，例如支持台灣參與世界衛生大會（WHA）與區域經貿組織。這可能使東京成為亞洲最公開支持台灣的首都之一。

然而，這樣的政策將讓日本陷入微妙的戰略困境：一方面要維持與美國的安全同盟，確保印太地區的平衡；另一方面又要避免與中國全面對立，損害日本在經貿上的巨大利益。中國仍是日本最大的貿易夥伴，若雙邊關係惡化，勢必波及日本出口、旅遊及能源供應鏈。

綜觀而言，高市早苗的當選象徵著日本政治的右傾化與安全戰略再定義。她的領導風格強勢、民族意識鮮明，勢必推動日本走向更積極的國防與外交姿態。而她若真能成為日本首位女首相，不僅將在國內改寫性別政治的歷史，也將在國際舞台上，重新定義日本在東亞安全結構中的角色。

未來的日本，將在「和平憲法的束縛」與「地緣安全的壓力」之間尋求新的平衡，而高市早苗的領導，可能會讓這個平衡點更靠近戰略強硬的一方。

Today marks a historic turning point in Japanese politics — 64-year-old Sanae Takaichi has been elected as the new president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), paving the way for her to potentially become Japan’s first female prime minister. Her victory not only reshapes Japan’s domestic political landscape but also carries major implications for future relations with China and Taiwan.

Sanae Takaichi was born in Nara Prefecture, Japan. Her mother was a police officer, and her father worked in the automobile industry. She graduated from Kobe University’s Faculty of Business Administration and later worked as a Congressional Fellow in the United States, where she studied the workings of the American political system and developed a deep interest in national security and international affairs.

Upon returning to Japan, Takaichi entered politics and quickly rose through the ranks of the LDP with her strong nationalist and conservative views. She is widely regarded as one of the most loyal successors to the late Shinzo Abe’s political vision, advocating for a stronger Japan, constitutional revision, and a tougher stance toward China. Her regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and her calls for Japan to “face its history with pride” have drawn praise from domestic conservatives but strong condemnation from China and South Korea.

In foreign and defense policy, Takaichi emphasizes a “security-first doctrine.” She believes Japan’s current pacifist Constitution, particularly Article 9, overly restricts the country’s ability to defend itself. She has repeatedly expressed her support for amending the Constitution to allow Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to act more proactively in regional security matters.

One of her most controversial proposals this year is the idea of establishing a “quasi-security alliance” with Taiwan. The proposal centers on closer cooperation in cybersecurity, maritime defense, and semiconductor supply chains, and envisions providing Japan’s “strategic support” to Taiwan in case of a crisis. This proposal was welcomed by Japanese conservatives and certain U.S. strategic circles as a way to counterbalance China, but it provoked strong backlash from Beijing, which denounced it as “interference in China’s internal affairs.”

If Takaichi formally becomes prime minister, several geopolitical trends are likely to emerge.

First, Japan–China relations could become increasingly tense. Takaichi has accused China of destabilizing the region through military actions in the East and South China Seas. Under her leadership, Japan is expected to further strengthen its security alliance with the United States, modernize its defense posture, and reinforce its military presence around the Nansei Islands (including Okinawa and the Miyako Islands). These moves would intensify strategic pressure on China and increase the risk of confrontation.

Second, Taiwan may find in Takaichi a more openly supportive partner. She is among the few Japanese politicians who have publicly stated that “a contingency in Taiwan is a contingency for Japan.” She is expected to advocate for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations such as the World Health Assembly (WHA) and to support deeper economic and security cooperation. This would make Tokyo one of the most pro-Taiwan capitals in Asia.

However, this approach also poses a dilemma for Japan. While Takaichi seeks to align more closely with the U.S. and bolster deterrence against China, she must also avoid triggering a full-blown diplomatic or economic confrontation with Beijing. China remains Japan’s largest trading partner, and any deterioration in bilateral ties could seriously affect Japan’s exports, tourism, and energy security.

Overall, Takaichi’s rise reflects a rightward shift in Japanese politics and a redefinition of Japan’s postwar security strategy. Her leadership style is assertive, her nationalism pronounced, and her foreign policy vision oriented toward greater strategic autonomy and military strength. If she does become Japan’s first female prime minister, she will not only make history domestically in terms of gender politics but also reshape Japan’s role in the Indo-Pacific.

Under Takaichi’s leadership, Japan is likely to pursue a more assertive and security-oriented path, seeking a delicate balance between its pacifist traditions and the growing geopolitical pressures of a changing world.