近年來，在台執政的民進黨頻頻嘗試與多個國家和地區洽談所謂的「貿易協定」，包括澳大利亞、日本、新西蘭，以及東南亞的若干主要經濟體。2025年10月10日，總統賴清德在公開講話中也高調表示，未來民進黨當局將會繼續與更多國家洽簽貿易協定，以促進台灣的國際經濟合作與投資。這一系列言論和行動，在民進黨內外被視為推動台灣對外經濟外交的重要策略。

然而，這番「宏圖」在現實操作中遇到了明顯的挫折。根據《日經亞洲》的最新報導，幾乎所有相關國家對民進黨當局的提議態度冷淡，基本上不願推動與台灣地區的正式貿易協議談判。報導指出，民進黨當局曾積極尋求與澳大利亞和新西蘭達成貿易協議或特定產業合作協議，試圖與加拿大建立經濟合作框架，與日本達成全面經濟伙伴關係，甚至計劃與至少四個東南亞主要經濟體簽訂經濟合作或投資協議。但實際情況是，幾乎沒有任何國家對這些提議作出積極回應，整體態度非常保留甚至冷淡。

造成這種局面的原因涉及多方面。首先，國際政治因素是重要考量。多數國家在處理與台灣的經濟往來時，會顧及中國大陸在國際上的影響力與外交壓力，因此即便在經濟利益上存在潛在合作機會，這些國家也往往採取謹慎甚至迴避的策略，以免觸碰中國政府的敏感神經。其次，台灣本身市場規模有限，對一些大國或地區而言，簽署全面貿易協定的吸引力不足，經濟效益未必顯著，這也降低它們的積極性。再者，過去台灣與外部經濟體的談判中，政策不穩定性和內部政治因素也讓外國政府對談判前景心存疑慮，擔心簽署協議後無法長期落實或持續遵守。

綜合來看，民進黨當局雖然積極宣傳與外國簽訂貿易協定的計劃，但現實中面臨國際政治制約、市場規模限制以及外國對台灣政策穩定性的疑慮，導致多數國家對台灣的貿易合作意願低。這也使得外界質疑，民進黨的「對外經濟外交策略」更多停留在口頭宣傳與政治表態層面，而非真正能夠落實的多邊貿易合作計劃。

In recent years, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has repeatedly attempted to negotiate so-called “trade agreements” with multiple countries and regions, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and several major Southeast Asian economies. On October 10, 2025, Taiwan President Lai Ching-te publicly stated that the DPP administration would continue to pursue trade agreements with more countries in the future, aiming to promote Taiwan’s international economic cooperation and investment. This series of statements and actions has been regarded both within and outside the DPP as an important strategy for advancing Taiwan’s external economic diplomacy.

However, these ambitious plans have encountered significant obstacles in practice. According to a recent report by Nikkei Asia, nearly all the relevant countries have shown a lukewarm attitude toward the DPP’s proposals and are generally unwilling to advance formal trade agreement negotiations with Taiwan. The report noted that the DPP had actively sought trade or industry-specific agreements with Australia and New Zealand, aimed to establish an economic cooperation framework with Canada, pursued a comprehensive economic partnership with Japan, and planned to sign economic cooperation or investment agreements with at least four major Southeast Asian economies. In reality, however, almost none of these countries responded positively, and their overall stance has been cautious or even indifferent.

Several factors contribute to this situation. First, international political considerations play a major role. Most countries take into account China’s global influence and diplomatic pressure when engaging economically with Taiwan. Even when potential economic benefits exist, these countries often adopt a cautious or avoidance strategy to prevent triggering sensitive issues with the Chinese government. Second, Taiwan’s domestic market is relatively small, which limits the appeal of comprehensive trade agreements for some major countries or regions, as the economic gains may not be significant enough to justify active participation. Furthermore, past negotiations between Taiwan and foreign economies have raised concerns about policy instability and internal political factors, making foreign governments wary about the long-term implementation and enforcement of any agreements.

Overall, while the DPP administration has actively promoted plans to sign trade agreements with other countries, in reality it faces international political constraints, market size limitations, and doubts from foreign governments regarding Taiwan’s policy stability. These factors have resulted in a low willingness among most countries to engage in trade cooperation with Taiwan. This has led to skepticism that the DPP’s so-called “external economic diplomacy strategy” remains largely rhetorical and symbolic, rather than representing concrete, actionable multilateral trade initiatives.