俄羅斯近期再次宣布重大擴軍計畫，官方明確表示將把總兵力提升至150萬人，並將此視為俄烏戰爭長期化背景下的必要調整。克里姆林宮釋出的訊息直白而強硬：面對西方的制裁、軍援與政治壓力，俄羅斯不會在戰場或談判桌上輕易妥協。這項擴軍措施不僅是軍事層面的調整，更是俄羅斯向外界宣示「準備打一場持久戰」的政治信號。

俄國國防部同時公布今年的徵兵成果，指出已有超過40萬名新兵加入正規軍，另外還有約3.4萬人加入志願兵部隊。從表面上看，俄羅斯似乎正快速補強兵力，甚至接近戰前水準，但實際情況卻更加複雜。儘管官方不斷提升招募人數與待遇，俄羅斯仍然無法完全填補前線與支援部隊的人力需求。

俄羅斯缺兵問題的核心，來自多層結構性因素。首先，俄烏戰爭是一場消耗量極高的現代戰爭，前線部隊承受長期砲擊、無人機攻擊與陣地爭奪，傷亡速度超過俄羅斯軍隊的自然補充能力。這意味著即使一年招募了數十萬人，仍無法彌補前線與後勤的損耗。

其次，俄羅斯在人口結構上已面臨長期危機。低出生率導致18至30歲適齡男性逐年下降，加上戰爭爆發後，大量中產階級與技術人才選擇移民、逃避徵兵，使得可徵召的基礎人口更加萎縮。即便國家提高軍人薪資、提供獎金或社會福利，仍難以吸引足夠的年輕人願意冒險前往高危險的戰場。

第三，俄軍的編制改革與擴張速度遠超過訓練與裝備的供給能力。快速擴軍迫使俄軍把部分新兵直接送上前線、以「邊戰邊練」的方式補足缺口，但這種做法本身提高了傷亡率，形成惡性循環。軍工體系雖被全面動員，但在短時間內仍難以為新增的數十萬兵力提供足夠的武器、防護裝備與後勤支援。

此外，志願兵與地方武裝雖成為俄羅斯補充兵源的重要渠道，但其訓練與指揮品質參差不齊，難以全面取代正規軍的戰鬥力。俄羅斯雖然努力避免再次進行大規模動員令，以免引發國內社會不滿，但這也使軍隊的補充主要依靠自願招募，進一步限制擴軍效果。

綜合來看，俄羅斯的擴軍計畫與招募數據表面上亮眼，但無法完全掩蓋其兵力不足的現實。高強度戰損、人口萎縮、訓練不足與軍工供給受限等因素，使俄羅斯即使宣布準備將軍隊擴充到150萬人，仍然難以在短期內真正達到預期的兵力規模。對莫斯科而言，這場戰爭不僅是政治與地緣戰略的較量，更逐漸成為一場牽涉整個國家人口與體制承受力的長期消耗戰。

Russia has once again announced a major expansion of its armed forces, declaring that the total number of troops will be increased to 1.5 million. In the context of a prolonged war with Ukraine, the Kremlin describes this move as a necessary adjustment and simultaneously as a clear political signal to the West. Through this announcement, Moscow is asserting that it will not compromise—neither under military pressure nor at the negotiating table. The expansion is not only a military restructuring but also an unmistakable declaration that Russia is preparing for a long and grinding conflict.

Along with the announcement, the Russian Ministry of Defense released its annual recruitment figures, stating that more than 400,000 new soldiers have joined the regular army this year, and an additional 34,000 have enlisted in volunteer units. On the surface, these numbers appear robust and suggest that Russia is rapidly replenishing its forces to levels close to those before the war. However, the reality on the ground is far more complex. Despite continuous efforts to improve recruitment incentives, Russia still struggles to fill the manpower demands of both front-line and support units.

The persistent shortage of Russian troops is rooted in several structural factors. First, the war in Ukraine has become an extremely high-consumption, high-casualty modern conflict. Front-line units face relentless artillery fire, drone strikes, and trench-based assaults, producing casualty rates that exceed the army’s natural replenishment capability. Even when Russia recruits hundreds of thousands of soldiers in a single year, it still cannot fully compensate for losses across front-line and logistical units.

Second, Russia’s demographic situation has been deteriorating for years. Low birth rates have reduced the number of men aged 18 to 30, the core pool for military conscription. The outbreak of war accelerated the demographic drain, as many middle-class and technically skilled citizens chose to emigrate or evade mobilization, further shrinking the pool of eligible recruits. Even though the government has offered higher pay, bonuses, and social benefits for soldiers, these incentives are insufficient to compensate for the extreme danger of front-line deployment.

Third, the pace of Russia’s military expansion has outstripped its capacity for training and equipping new troops. Rapid troop increases forced the military to send some recruits to the battlefield with limited preparation, effectively learning “on the job” under fire. This not only reduces overall combat effectiveness but also increases casualty rates, creating a vicious cycle. Although Russia has fully mobilized its defense industry, it remains difficult to supply hundreds of thousands of new troops with adequate weapons, protective gear, and logistical support in a short period.

Volunteer battalions and regional militias have helped expand manpower but vary greatly in training quality and command structure, limiting their ability to replace the operational effectiveness of regular units. Furthermore, the Kremlin is reluctant to impose another full-scale mobilization, fearing domestic unrest similar to what occurred after the 2022 draft announcement. As a result, the military relies heavily on voluntary enlistment, which naturally limits recruitment potential.

In summary, Russia’s expansion plan and recruitment numbers may look impressive on paper, but they cannot fully conceal the reality of a persistent troop shortage. High casualty rates, demographic decline, insufficient training capacity, and the limits of industrial production mean that even with a declared target of 1.5 million troops, Russia may struggle to reach that number in practice. For Moscow, the conflict is no longer merely a geopolitical contest but increasingly a long-term test of the country’s demographic resilience, industrial capabilities, and societal endurance.