截至2025年底，中國在台海周邊持續展現高度軍事存在與政治壓力，無論是軍機繞台、軍演常態化，或是在外交與法律層面的強硬表態，都讓外界感受到緊張氛圍。然而，儘管如此，北京仍未選擇發動全面戰爭，這並非單一因素所致，而是多重結構性現實交織下的結果。

首先，經濟層面的代價依然是最關鍵的制約因素之一。台灣在全球半導體與高科技供應鏈中佔據無可取代的核心位置，一旦台海爆發戰爭，衝擊的不僅是區域經濟，而是整個全球產業體系。從先進製程晶片到關鍵電子零組件，供應中斷勢必引發連鎖效應，全球金融市場劇烈震盪，這樣的後果不可能只由對手承擔，中國自身同樣難以倖免。更現實的是，若主動發動戰爭，中國極可能遭遇比照俄羅斯在烏俄戰爭後所承受的國際制裁。即便近年中美之間出現脫鉤趨勢，但中國與歐盟、東南亞、日本與韓國之間的經貿依存仍然極深，而這些經濟體對區域穩定有高度需求，也不可能對台海衝突完全置身事外。

在軍事與戰略層面，全面動武同樣並非一個「穩賺不賠」的選項。台灣海峽的地理條件本身就是一道天然屏障，天候多變、海象複雜，使大規模跨海登陸行動的難度極高。即便解放軍近年在海空軍與兩棲作戰能力上快速成長，外界普遍仍認為其在真正長時間維持封鎖、確保登陸後補給線安全，以及應對高強度聯合作戰方面，仍處於持續完善與測試的階段。更重要的是，美國基於《台灣關係法》與相關政策，長期將台海穩定視為區域安全的重要一環，而截至2025年底，美國最新的國家安全戰略文件仍將台灣定位為印太戰略的關鍵節點。日本方面亦多次公開表達對台海安全的高度關切，顯示一旦情勢失控，衝突極可能迅速國際化，這對北京而言意味著極高的不確定性。

因此，許多軍事與戰略專家指出，中國目前更偏好成本相對較低、風險可控的「灰色地帶」策略。這類手段介於和平與戰爭之間，包括軍機、軍艦的高頻度活動、經濟與法律壓力、資訊戰，以及針對基礎設施的非傳統威脅，例如海底電纜破壞等。這些行為能持續對台灣施壓，測試對手反應，同時避免直接跨越引發全面戰爭的門檻。

從內部與政治動機來看，中國當前仍面臨不小的結構性挑戰。經濟成長放緩、房地產市場調整、地方政府財政壓力與金融風險累積，都使「內部穩定」成為領導層的重要優先事項。在這樣的背景下，全面戰爭所帶來的不確定性，反而可能加劇內部風險，削弱長期治理能力。此外，多份國際與區域智庫的研究都指出，中國的軍事現代化與國家發展目標往往以較長時間軸來規劃，例如2027年、2035或2049年，這些年份更多被視為能力建構或象徵性里程碑，而非代表2025年就是必然的開戰時點。

回到2025年的現狀來看，北京對台立場確實轉趨強硬，無論是在軍事姿態、對台法律威嚇，或是針對特定政治人物的點名施壓，都顯示出耐心正在被逐步消耗。然而，多數分析仍認為，在現階段，「維持現狀」對北京而言，仍然比高風險的軍事冒險更具吸引力。透過非軍事手段、長期消耗戰式的壓力操作，以及逐步擴張自身軍事實力與影響力，反而更符合其現實利益。

總體而言，截至目前中國選擇「不打」，並非因為缺乏意圖，而是因為戰爭的整體成本過高、軍事勝算並非百分之百確定，加上內部經濟與社會壓力，使得立即以全面戰爭方式解決台灣問題，並非最理性的選項。在這樣的結構下，台海局勢更可能持續呈現高壓但未失控的狀態，而非迅速滑向全面衝突。

As of the end of 2025, although China continues to maintain high-intensity military pressure around the Taiwan Strait, it has not launched a full-scale war. The main reasons can be understood across several key dimensions.

First, the economic costs would be enormous. Taiwan occupies a central position in the global semiconductor supply chain, and any outbreak of war would severely disrupt global production networks, potentially triggering a worldwide economic shock. China itself would be unable to escape the fallout. In addition, initiating a war would expose China to the risk of severe international sanctions similar to those imposed on Russia after the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Even though there are signs of economic decoupling between China and the United States, China’s trade relations with the European Union, Southeast Asia, Japan, and South Korea remain deeply intertwined. These economies all have strong interests in regional stability and would be highly sensitive to conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Second, military and strategic considerations remain a major constraint. Conducting a cross-strait amphibious invasion is extremely difficult due to the challenging geography and weather conditions of the Taiwan Strait. Large-scale landing operations are widely regarded as one of the most complex forms of warfare, and assessments suggest that the People’s Liberation Army is still in a process of refining its amphibious assault and blockade-control capabilities. At the same time, the potential for U.S. and Japanese military involvement weighs heavily on Beijing’s calculations. The United States continues to uphold regional stability under the Taiwan Relations Act, and as of late 2025, its latest National Security Strategy still identifies Taiwan as a critical strategic node. Japan has also repeatedly expressed strong concern over security in the Taiwan Strait. Against this backdrop, many experts believe China currently prefers lower-cost “gray-zone” strategies, such as partial blockade scenarios, frequent military aircraft incursions, or actions like disrupting undersea cables, rather than initiating an all-out war.

Third, internal conditions and political motivations play an important role. China is facing significant domestic economic challenges, including stress in the real estate sector and broader financial risks. Under these circumstances, maintaining overall stability may hold greater strategic value for the leadership than taking the high-risk path of immediate military unification. Moreover, multiple think tank reports point out that years such as 2027, 2035, or 2049 are often cited as key milestones for China’s military modernization or national development goals. These timelines do not necessarily imply that 2025 is a predetermined window for launching a war.

Looking specifically at the situation in 2025, maintaining the status quo is still seen as preferable to a high-risk gamble. Although Beijing’s stance toward Taiwan has grown more assertive and legal or political pressure on specific Taiwanese figures has intensified, most analyses suggest that China is currently inclined to “temporarily maintain the status quo.” This approach relies on non-military means, combined with gradual military capability expansion, to seek strategic dominance over time rather than through immediate conflict.

In summary, the current choice not to fight reflects the fact that the costs of war remain extraordinarily high, the prospects of a swift and decisive military victory are not guaranteed, and domestic economic pressures outweigh the urgency of immediate unification.