委內瑞拉身為全球石油儲量名列前茅的國家，卻在短短數十年間陷入全面性的經濟與社會崩潰，這樣的反差本身就凸顯出其危機並非單一事件所致，而是多重結構性問題長期累積、相互放大的結果。進入2026年初，委內瑞拉更因政權更迭而陷入劇烈動盪，使原已脆弱的經濟體系雪上加霜，也讓外界重新審視其崩潰背後的深層原因。

從經濟結構來看，委內瑞拉長期過度依賴石油，幾乎將國家命運完全綁定在單一資源之上。石油出口多年來占其外匯收入的八成以上，使政府在油價高漲時期擁有龐大的財政空間，卻也因此陷入典型的「資源詛咒」。在油價高企的年代，政府大量利用石油收入進口食品、民生用品與工業製成品，同時推行高額補貼政策，以短期分配取代長期發展。這種做法雖然一度維持表面的繁榮與政治支持度，卻嚴重擠壓本國農業與製造業的生存空間，使本土產業逐步空洞化。一旦國際油價下跌，或因內部問題導致產量下滑，國家立即失去主要資金來源，無力維持基本的社會運作與公共服務，經濟體系也隨之失速。

制度與治理層面的問題同樣是關鍵因素。自前總統查維茲執政時期開始，委內瑞拉推動大規模國有化政策，國營企業被賦予高度政治任務，其中尤以國營石油公司PDVSA為核心。政府將大量政治盟友與忠誠人士安插進管理層，專業技術與經營能力反而被置於次要位置。結果是，大批具經驗的工程師與技術人員遭到排擠或選擇離開國家，基礎設施逐年老化卻缺乏維護，電力供應不穩、煉油設備頻繁故障，直接拖累原油生產能力。委內瑞拉的原油日產量，從1999年約350萬桶的高峰，一路下滑至近年的約100萬桶，甚至在某些時期更低，顯示制度失靈對產能造成的長期傷害。

此外，委內瑞拉石油資源本身也存在結構性挑戰。該國石油以超重油為主，開採與精煉成本遠高於美國或中東地區的輕質油，對技術、資本與設備依賴極高。在外資撤離、技術封鎖與資金枯竭的情況下，這些油田即使理論上儲量龐大，實際上卻難以有效轉化為穩定產出，使「石油大國」逐漸淪為空有資源卻無力開採的矛盾狀態。

在宏觀經濟政策方面，錯誤的決策進一步將危機推向失控。為了填補龐大的財政赤字，政府長期依賴印鈔來支應支出，導致貨幣體系徹底崩潰，通膨失控並演變為全球最嚴重的惡性通膨之一。貨幣快速貶值使民眾儲蓄化為烏有，薪資幾乎每天都在失去購買力。外界估計，若情勢未獲根本改善，通膨率在2026年底仍可能高達數百個百分點，讓正常經濟交易幾乎無法進行。與此同時，政府為壓抑物價、維持社會穩定而實施嚴格的價格管制，但這些價格往往嚴重脫離成本現實，迫使企業停產或轉入黑市，反而造成糧食、藥品與基本民生用品長期短缺，最終引發大規模的人道危機與難民外流。

國際環境與地緣政治則是壓垮經濟的另一層力量。多年來，美國針對委內瑞拉石油產業與金融體系實施嚴厲制裁，切斷其在國際市場的融資與銷售管道，使本就脆弱的經濟更加孤立。進入2026年，局勢出現劇烈變化。據傳在2026年1月，美國軍方直接逮捕時任領導人馬杜羅，導致政權瞬間真空，國內政治秩序陷入高度不確定狀態。即便制裁政策未來出現調整空間，短期內政局混亂、法律與權力結構不明，也使外資難以回流，石油基礎設施更無法迅速修復或擴產。

綜合而言，委內瑞拉的經濟崩潰並非單一錯誤或短期衝擊所造成，而是資源過度集中、制度失能、政策失誤與國際制裁相互疊加的結果。即使擁有全球數一數二的石油儲量，在缺乏良好治理、多元產業與穩定制度的前提下，這些資源不但未能成為發展的引擎，反而成為長期困住國家的枷鎖。未來即便政權更替完成，真正的重建仍將是一條漫長且充滿不確定性的道路。

Venezuela, despite being one of the countries with the largest proven oil reserves in the world, has experienced a comprehensive economic and social collapse over the span of just a few decades. This stark contrast highlights that the crisis is not the result of a single event, but rather the outcome of multiple structural problems that accumulated over a long period and reinforced one another. By early 2026, Venezuela had entered a phase of intense turmoil driven by regime change, further exacerbating an already fragile economic system and prompting renewed scrutiny of the deeper causes behind its collapse.

From a structural perspective, Venezuela’s economy has long been excessively dependent on oil, effectively tying the fate of the entire country to a single resource. For many years, oil exports accounted for more than 80 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. During periods of high oil prices, this dependence gave the government substantial fiscal space, but it also trapped the country in a classic case of the “resource curse.” When oil prices were elevated, the government used oil revenues to import large quantities of food, consumer goods, and industrial products, while simultaneously implementing generous subsidy programs. Although this approach temporarily sustained a sense of prosperity and political support, it severely squeezed the domestic agricultural and manufacturing sectors, gradually hollowing out the local productive base. Once international oil prices fell, or domestic production declined due to internal problems, the state rapidly lost its primary source of funding and became unable to sustain basic social operations and public services, causing the economic system to spiral downward.

Institutional and governance failures have been equally critical. Beginning in the era of former President Hugo Chávez, Venezuela pursued large-scale nationalization policies, assigning state-owned enterprises heavy political responsibilities, with the state oil company PDVSA at the center. Political loyalty increasingly took precedence over professional competence, as allies and loyalists were installed in management positions. As a result, large numbers of experienced engineers and technical specialists were marginalized or chose to leave the country altogether. Infrastructure steadily deteriorated without proper maintenance, electricity supply became unstable, and refinery equipment suffered frequent breakdowns, directly undermining oil production capacity. Venezuela’s daily oil output fell from a peak of around 3.5 million barrels in 1999 to roughly 1 million barrels in recent years, and at times even lower, illustrating the long-term damage caused by institutional dysfunction.

The nature of Venezuela’s oil resources themselves also presents structural challenges. Much of the country’s reserves consist of extra-heavy crude, which is far more costly to extract and refine than the light crude produced in the United States or the Middle East. Such operations require advanced technology, substantial capital, and specialized equipment. In the context of capital flight, technological isolation, and chronic underinvestment, these vast reserves have been difficult to translate into stable production. As a result, Venezuela has increasingly become a paradoxical “oil giant” rich in resources but unable to effectively exploit them.

Macroeconomic policy failures further pushed the crisis toward collapse. To finance persistent fiscal deficits, the government relied heavily on money printing, ultimately destroying the monetary system and triggering one of the most severe episodes of hyperinflation in modern history. Rapid currency depreciation wiped out household savings, and wages lost purchasing power almost daily. Observers estimate that without fundamental reform, inflation could still reach several hundred percent by the end of 2026, making normal economic transactions nearly impossible. At the same time, in an effort to suppress prices and maintain social stability, the government imposed strict price controls. These prices, however, were often far removed from actual production costs, forcing businesses to halt operations or turn to the black market. The result was chronic shortages of food, medicine, and basic necessities, ultimately leading to a large-scale humanitarian crisis and mass emigration.

International factors and geopolitical pressures have also played a decisive role in deepening Venezuela’s economic collapse. For years, the United States imposed stringent sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector and financial system, effectively cutting off access to international financing and export markets and further isolating an already weakened economy. In early 2026, the situation escalated dramatically. Reports indicate that in January 2026, U.S. military forces detained then-leader Nicolás Maduro, creating an abrupt power vacuum and plunging the country into extreme political uncertainty. Even if sanctions were to be relaxed in the future, the immediate aftermath of political chaos—marked by unclear authority structures and legal uncertainty—would make it difficult for foreign investment to return, while oil infrastructure would remain unable to recover or expand in the short term.

In sum, Venezuela’s economic collapse is not the product of a single mistake or short-term shock, but the cumulative result of excessive resource dependence, institutional failure, policy mismanagement, and international sanctions reinforcing one another over time. Even with some of the world’s largest oil reserves, the absence of effective governance, economic diversification, and stable institutions meant that these resources failed to serve as an engine of development and instead became a long-term constraint. Even if political transition is completed, genuine recovery is likely to be a long and highly uncertain process.