中國農村人口在脫貧之後，實際上仍長期承受多重系統性與結構性壓力。儘管中國官方於2020年宣布已全面消除「絕對貧困」，但這一成果更多是以收入線與行政指標為基準，並不代表農村社會已具備穩定抵禦風險、持續改善生活品質的能力。進入2025至2026年之際，「返貧風險」與「相對貧困」問題不但沒有消失，反而在經濟放緩與人口結構變化下愈加凸顯。

首先，城鄉二元體制依然是農村發展最根本的制度性限制。現行戶籍制度將人口嚴格區分為城市與農村，公共資源的配置長期向城市集中。大量農村勞動力以農民工身分進入城市，卻難以在教育、醫療、住房、公積金與社會保障等方面獲得與城市居民同等的待遇。這種「人在城市、權利在農村」的狀態，使得農村家庭即使依賴外出務工增加收入，也很難累積長期穩定的資本與社會保障，一旦遭遇失業或經濟下行，便迅速暴露脆弱性。同時，土地、勞動力與資金等關鍵要素持續由農村向城市單向流動，支撐了城市工業化與房地產擴張，但相關收益卻難以有效回流農村，導致農村地區在發展起點上長期處於劣勢。

其次，農村家庭整體經濟抗風險能力依然極低，這也是「返貧」現象反覆出現的核心原因。許多剛脫貧或接近脫貧線的家庭，本身並沒有真正建立穩定的收入結構，而是高度依賴單一工作、補貼或政策性收入。在全球經濟波動、內需疲弱與就業機會減少的背景下，一次重大疾病、一場自然災害，或一次失業，就足以讓整個家庭迅速跌回貧困狀態。特別是近年極端氣候對農業生產的衝擊日益頻繁，使本就利潤微薄的小農經濟更加不穩定。此外，不少脫貧地區發展的產業結構單一，往往集中於低附加值的初級農產品或簡單加工，缺乏市場競爭力，一旦需求下降或價格波動，整個地方經濟便同步受創。

在人力資本層面，農村與城市之間的落差依舊明顯。受限於教育資源不足與家庭經濟條件，許多農村人口的受教育年限與技能水準偏低，難以適應數位經濟、自動化製造或現代服務業的需求。這使得農村勞動力在就業市場中多集中於低薪、高風險、缺乏保障的工作類型，收入天花板明顯。同時，長期的人口外流導致農村嚴重「空心化」，青壯年勞動力離開後，留下的多是老人、兒童與慢性病患者，這些群體本身缺乏再就業與自我發展能力，只能高度依賴政府補貼、最低生活保障與臨時救助，進一步加重公共財政負擔。

土地制度的侷限性也是農村難以真正累積財富的重要原因。雖然近年推動土地流轉與集約化經營，但在實際操作中，多數農民仍停留在小規模耕作階段，農業收益偏低且高度不穩定。農村土地難以像城市不動產那樣充分資產化，農民既無法自由處置土地，也難以將其轉化為有效的融資工具，導致原始資本積累幾乎不可能完成。這種制度設計在客觀上限制農村居民透過自身資產實現階級流動的可能性。

在政策與治理層面，脫貧成果的可持續性本身就高度依賴政府的長期投入。隨著2026年「十五五」規劃正式啟動，官方仍反覆強調必須「鞏固拓展脫貧攻堅成果」，並嚴防「規模性返貧」，這本身就反映出脫貧並非一勞永逸，而是一項需要長期高額公共支出的艱鉅工程。然而，在經濟增速放緩、地方債務壓力上升的情況下，基層政府同時面臨財政吃緊與考核壓力，扶貧政策在執行層面容易流於維穩式補貼，難以真正轉化為結構性改善。

綜合來看，中國農村脫貧困難的本質，早已超越單純的收入問題，而是城鄉結構性失衡、社會保障制度不均、人口老化與經濟轉型陣痛相互交織的結果。在缺乏制度性突破的前提下，農村脫貧成果只能靠持續輸血維持，其脆弱性也將在任何一次外部衝擊中再次暴露。

After achieving poverty alleviation, China’s rural population continues to face long-term pressure from multiple systemic and structural challenges. Although the Chinese government announced in 2020 that “absolute poverty” had been eradicated nationwide, this achievement was largely based on income thresholds and administrative indicators. It does not necessarily mean that rural society has acquired the capacity to withstand risks on a sustained basis or to continuously improve overall living standards. As China moves into the period of 2025–2026, the risks of “falling back into poverty” and the persistence of “relative poverty” have not diminished; instead, they have become increasingly pronounced amid economic slowdown and demographic change.

At the institutional level, the long-standing urban–rural dual structure remains the most fundamental constraint on rural development. The current household registration (hukou) system rigidly divides the population into urban and rural categories, with public resources disproportionately concentrated in cities. Large numbers of rural residents migrate to urban areas as migrant workers, yet they are unable to enjoy equal access to education, healthcare, housing, housing funds, and social security. This condition—being physically present in cities while rights remain tied to rural status—means that even when rural households increase their income through migrant work, they struggle to accumulate long-term assets or stable social protection. Once unemployment or an economic downturn occurs, their vulnerability is quickly exposed. At the same time, key factors of production such as land, labor, and capital continue to flow unilaterally from rural areas to cities, supporting industrialization and urban real estate expansion, while the resulting benefits rarely flow back to the countryside. This has left rural regions structurally disadvantaged at the starting point of development.

In addition, the overall economic resilience of rural households remains weak, which lies at the heart of the recurring problem of people slipping back into poverty. Many families that have only recently escaped poverty, or are hovering just above the poverty line, have not established stable income structures. Instead, they often rely heavily on a single job, government subsidies, or policy-based transfers. Against the backdrop of global economic volatility, weak domestic demand, and shrinking employment opportunities, a serious illness, a natural disaster, or a spell of unemployment can be enough to push an entire household back into poverty. In recent years, the growing frequency of extreme weather events has further undermined agricultural production, making small-scale farming—already characterized by thin margins—even more unstable. Moreover, many formerly impoverished regions rely on highly concentrated and low-end industrial structures, often centered on primary agricultural products or simple processing. These industries lack competitiveness, and once demand declines or prices fluctuate, the local economy as a whole suffers.

Constraints on human capital development further widen the rural–urban divide. Due to limited educational resources and household financial conditions, many rural residents have lower levels of education and fewer marketable skills, making it difficult for them to adapt to the requirements of the digital economy, automated manufacturing, or modern service industries. As a result, rural labor tends to be concentrated in low-wage, high-risk jobs with little protection and a clear income ceiling. Meanwhile, long-term population outflows have led to severe “hollowing out” of rural communities. As young and middle-aged workers leave, those who remain are often the elderly, children, and people with chronic illnesses. These groups generally lack the capacity for self-development or reemployment and depend heavily on government transfers such as subsidies, minimum living allowances, and emergency assistance, thereby increasing fiscal pressure on the state.

Limitations within the land system also play a crucial role in preventing rural residents from accumulating real wealth. Although reforms promoting land transfer and more intensive land use have been introduced, in practice most farmers remain engaged in small-scale cultivation with low and highly unstable returns. Rural land cannot be fully assetized in the same way as urban real estate. Farmers are unable to freely dispose of their land or effectively use it as collateral for financing, making the accumulation of initial capital extremely difficult. This institutional design objectively restricts opportunities for upward social mobility based on asset ownership.

From a policy and governance perspective, the sustainability of poverty alleviation outcomes is itself highly dependent on continued government input. As the “15th Five-Year Plan” period begins in 2026, official discourse continues to emphasize the need to “consolidate and expand the achievements of poverty alleviation” and to guard against “large-scale relapse into poverty.” This, in itself, reflects the reality that poverty alleviation is not a one-off accomplishment but a demanding long-term task requiring substantial public expenditure. However, amid slowing economic growth and mounting local government debt, grassroots authorities face tightening fiscal conditions alongside intense performance evaluation pressures. As a result, poverty alleviation policies at the implementation level often devolve into stabilization-oriented subsidies, rather than generating genuine structural improvement.

In summary, the difficulties surrounding rural poverty alleviation in China are no longer simply a matter of individual income. They are the outcome of deeply entrenched urban–rural structural imbalances, unequal social security systems, population aging, and the growing pains of economic transformation. Without substantive institutional breakthroughs, the achievements of rural poverty reduction can only be sustained through continuous fiscal support, and their inherent fragility will inevitably be exposed whenever major external shocks occur.