進入2026年後，中國快遞末端配送行業正迎來一場前所未有的大規模洗牌。根據多家主流媒體與業內人士的交叉統計，全國已有約18萬家快遞驛站選擇關停、退出經營，或以極低價格轉讓，形成2026年開年以來最明顯的一波「倒閉潮」。這不僅是個別經營不善的案例，而是一場結構性問題集中爆發後的行業震盪。

從根本來看，這場洗牌源自多年累積的「內捲式競爭」與政策、成本多重擠壓，讓原本就脆弱的末端驛站幾乎失去生存空間。首先在收益層面，利潤被壓縮到近乎不可持續的程度。隨著各大快遞公司長期打價格戰，末端派費一路下探，驛站代收一件包裹的收入，已從高峰期約1.5元人民幣，下滑到如今普遍僅剩0.3至0.6 元。包裹數量雖然仍在成長，但單票收入過低，使得「多勞並不多得」成為常態。許多驛站負責人每天工作超過十二小時，全年無休，扣除店面租金、水電、人工與雜費後，實際月收入往往只剩幾千元，甚至不如普通藍領工作，長期下來難以支撐家庭與生活。

在營運層面，嚴苛的考核制度與高頻罰款進一步放大經營風險。快遞總部透過精細化指標管理，將大量風險層層下移到末端驛站，遺失包裹、配送延誤、客訴評價、未即時上架等，都可能觸發罰款機制。一旦發生疏失，動輒50 元、上百元的罰金，往往就能抵銷掉驛站數百件包裹的微薄利潤。再加上近年監管趨嚴，對「送貨上門」與服務品質的要求不斷提高，驛站必須增加人手與管理投入，卻同時承擔更高的合規風險，形成進退兩難的局面。

市場結構本身的問題同樣不容忽視。由於早期加盟門檻極低，快遞驛站一度被視為「低成本創業項目」，大量創業者湧入，導致不少社區或小區內，同時存在多個品牌驛站，如菜鳥、兔喜、媽媽驛站等彼此競爭。包裹量被嚴重分流後，單一驛站的基本盤被削弱，即便全區快遞量增加，個體仍難以形成規模效應。加上服務模式高度同質化，長期依賴「拼數量」的粗放經營，在行業進入調整期時，幾乎沒有抵禦風險的能力。

展望2026年後的行業走向，監管部門已釋出明確訊號。中國國家郵政局在2026年全國郵政工作會議中提出，將重點整治「內捲式競爭」，推動快遞行業從單純追求規模與速度，轉向重視服務品質、效率與合理利潤分配。業內普遍認為，當前這波驛站倒閉潮，本質上是市場在長期失衡後的「自我出清」。未來能夠存活的末端驛站，將不再只是單一的取件點，而是朝向社區綜合服務站轉型，例如結合社區團購、洗衣、回收、便民零售等多元業務，分散對派費的高度依賴；或透過區域共配、規模化整合來降低單位成本，提升談判能力。

整體而言，這場席捲全國的「大撤退」，揭示快遞末端在經歷十多年高速擴張後，終究必須面對利益分配重構與商業模式重生的現實。對許多驛站經營者來說，這既是一場殘酷的淘汰，也是行業走向理性與可持續發展之前，難以避免的陣痛期。

As China enters 2026, the country’s last-mile parcel delivery sector is undergoing an unprecedented large-scale shake-up. According to cross-verified figures from multiple major media outlets and industry observers, around 180,000 parcel pickup stations nationwide have chosen to shut down, withdraw from operations, or transfer their businesses at extremely low prices. This has formed the first clearly visible “bankruptcy wave” of 2026. Rather than being isolated cases of poor management, this phenomenon represents a structural crisis erupting across the entire industry.

At its core, this reshuffling is the result of years of accumulated “involutionary competition,” compounded by mounting policy pressure and rising operating costs, which have pushed already fragile last-mile stations to the brink of survival. On the revenue side, profit margins have been compressed to an almost unsustainable level. As major courier companies have engaged in prolonged price wars, delivery fees paid to pickup stations have continued to fall. The average income per parcel collected has dropped from around 1.5 yuan at its peak to only about 0.3–0.6 yuan today. Although overall parcel volumes are still growing, the extremely low income per package means that “working harder does not translate into earning more.” Many station operators work more than twelve hours a day, year-round without breaks, yet after deducting rent, utilities, labor costs, and miscellaneous expenses, their monthly net income often amounts to only a few thousand yuan—sometimes less than that of ordinary blue-collar jobs—making long-term operation financially untenable.

Operational pressures further amplify these risks. Stringent performance assessments and frequent penalties have become a heavy burden. Courier headquarters increasingly rely on refined metrics to shift operational risks downward, leaving pickup stations exposed to fines for lost parcels, delivery delays, customer complaints, or even minor procedural lapses. A single mistake can trigger penalties of 50 yuan or even several hundred yuan, instantly wiping out the slim profits generated by handling hundreds of parcels. At the same time, tighter regulatory oversight has raised requirements for door-to-door delivery and service quality, forcing stations to hire more staff and invest more in management, while simultaneously facing greater compliance risks. This has created a situation in which operators are squeezed from both sides.

Structural problems within the market itself have also played a major role. In the early stages, extremely low entry barriers led many people to view parcel pickup stations as an easy, low-cost entrepreneurial opportunity. As a result, multiple competing brands—such as Cainiao, Tuhu, and Mama Station—often clustered within the same residential communities. Parcel volumes were split among them, weakening the profit base of each individual station. Even when total deliveries in a neighborhood increased, individual operators struggled to achieve economies of scale. With services largely homogeneous and long reliant on a volume-driven, rough operating model, these stations had little resilience once the industry entered a period of adjustment.

Looking ahead beyond 2026, regulators have already sent clear signals about the industry’s future direction. At the National Postal Work Conference in 2026, China’s State Post Bureau explicitly stated that it would comprehensively address “involutionary competition” and push the courier sector to shift from a model driven purely by scale and speed toward one focused on service quality, efficiency, and more reasonable profit distribution. Many industry experts believe that the current wave of closures represents a form of market “self-cleansing” after years of imbalance. The stations that survive are expected to transform from simple parcel pickup points into community-based comprehensive service hubs, integrating services such as community group buying, laundry, recycling, and convenience retail to reduce overreliance on delivery fees. Others may pursue regional consolidation and shared distribution models to lower unit costs and strengthen bargaining power.

Overall, this nationwide “great retreat” reflects a hard truth: after more than a decade of rapid expansion, China’s last-mile delivery sector must confront a fundamental restructuring of its profit-sharing mechanisms and business models. For many station operators, this period is both a brutal elimination process and an unavoidable painful transition toward a more rational and sustainable industry future.